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Summary 
The Alaska Criminal Code Revision Commission was established in 1975, and reestablished in June 1976 as a 
Subcommission of the newly formed Code Commission, with the responsibility to present a comprehensive 
revision of Alaska’s criminal code for consideration by the Alaska State Legislature. Tentative Draft, Part 3, is 
composed of five articles contained in the Offenses Against Property chapter of the draft Revised Criminal 
Code: theft and related offenses; burglary and criminal trespass; arson, criminal mischief, and related 
offenses (part 1); forgery and related offenses; and general provisions. Commentary following each article is 
designed to aid the reader in analyzing the effect of the draft Revised Code on existing law and also provides 
a section-by-section analysis of each provision of the draft Revised Code. Appendices include derivations of 
each provision of the Code; existing law that the Code will revise; and an index to commentary. 
Additional information 
As of 1975, Alaska’s criminal laws were based primarily on Oregon criminal statutes as they existed at the 
close of the nineteenth century, with new statutes added and old statutes amended over the succeeding 75 
years by Alaska territorial and state legislatures in a piecemeal approach to revision. This resulted in a 
criminal code containing outdated statutes, obsolete terminology, a number of overly specific statutes, a  
haphazard approach to mens rea (the culpable mental state with which a defendant must perform an act in 
order to be convicted of a crime) and the lack of a coherent, rational sentencing structure. 
The Alaska Criminal Code Revision Commission was established in 1975 with the responsibility to present a 
comprehensive revision of Alaska’s criminal code for consideration by the Alaska State Legislature. (The 
Commission was reestablished in June 1976 as a Subcommission of the newly formed Code Commission.) 
Staff services for the Criminal Code Revision Commission and Criminal Code Revision Subcommission were 
provided by the Criminal Justice Center at University of Alaska, Anchorage (John Havelock, project executive 
director; Barry Jeffrey Stern, reporter/staff counsel; Sheila Gallagher, Reporter/Staff Counsel; and Peter Smith 
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Ring, research director). The tentative draft proposed by the Criminal Code Revision Subcommission was 
substantially amended by the Alaska State Legislature prior to its approval as the Revised Alaska Criminal 
Code in June 1978 (effective January 1, 1980). 
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INTRODUCTION TO TENTATIVE DRAFT, PART 3 
Tentative Draft, Part 3, is composed of five articles 
contained in the Offenses Against Property chapter of the 
Revised Criminal Code - theft and related offenses, burglary 
and criminal trespass, arson and criminal michief and related 
offenses, forgery and related offenses and general provisions. 
Tentative Draft, Part 2, was distributed in early 
March and was comprised of seven articles of the Revised 
Criminal Code - general principles of criminal liability, 
parties to crime, justification, attempt and related offenses, 
robbery, bribery and related offenses and perjury and related 
offenses. 
Tentative Draft, Part 1, was distributed in early 
February and was comprised of four articles contained in the 
Offenses Against the Person chapter of the Revised Criminal 
Code - criminal homicide, assault and related offenses, 
kidrtapping and related offenses and sexual offenses. 
Commentary follows each article in the Tentative 
Draft and is designed to aid the reader in analyzing the 
effect of the Revised Code on existing law. The Commentary 
also provides a section-by-section analysis of each provision 
of the Revised Code. All references in the Commentary to 
Tentative Draft provisions contain the letters TD before the 
usual AS cite. 
Each Tentative Draft also contains several appendixes 
that will be useful in analyzing the Revised Code. 
1. 
Appendix I lists the derivations of all sections 
in the Revised Code. 
Appendix II allows the reader to compare provisions 
of the Revised Code with existing law. 
Finally, Appendix III is comprised of an index 
which can be used in locating the page of Commentary in 
which a provision of the Revised Code is discussed. 
2 . 
-I CHAPTER 46. OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY. 
ARTICLE 
1. Theft and related offenses (secs. 100 - 280) 
2. Burglary and Criminal Trespass (secs. 300 - 350) 
3. Arson, Criminal Mischief and related offenses (secs. 400 - 490) 
4. Forgery and related offenses (secs. 500 - ?80) 5. Business and Commercial Offenses [RESERVED] 
6. General Provisions (secs. 980 - 990) 
ARTICLE 1. THEFT AND RELATED OFFENSES. 
Section 
100 Theft Defined 
110 Consolidation of Theft Offenses 
120 Defenses to Theft 
130 Theft in the First Degree 
140 Theft in the Second Degree 
150 Theft in the Third Degree 
160 Theft of Lost or Mislaid Property 
180 Theft by Deception 
190 Theft by Receiving 
195 Extortion 
200 Theft of Services 
210 Theft by Failure to Make Required Disposition of Funds Received 
220 Concealment of Merchandise 
230 Reasonable Detention as Defense 
240 Unauthorized Use of Propelled Vehicle 
250 Unauthorized Occupancy of a Propelled Vehicle 
260 Removal of Identification Marks 
270 Unlawful Possession 
280 Issuing a Bad Check [RESERVED] 
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Sec. 1 1. 46. 100. THEFT DEFINED. A person commits theft when, 
with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate property of 
another to himself or to a third person, he 
(1) takes, appropriates, obtains or withholds the property of 
another; 
( 2) commits theft of property lost, mislaid or delivered by 
mistake as provided in sec. 160 of this chapter; 
(3)  commits theft by deception as provided in sec. 180 of 
this chapter; or 
(4) commits theft by receiving as provided in sec. 190 of 
this chapter. 
Sec. 1 1. 46.110. CONSOLIDATION OF THEFT OFFENSES: PLEADING AND 
PROOF. (a) Conduct defined as theft under sec. 100 of this chapter 
constitutes a single offense. 
(b) An accusation bf theft is sufficient if it alleges that the 
defendant committed theft of property of the nature or value required 
for the commission of the crime charged without designating the particula 
way or manner in which the theft was committed. 
(c) Proof that the defendant engaged in conduct constituting theft 
as defined in sec. 100 of this chapter is sufficient to support a con­
viction based upon any indictment, information or complaint for theft. 
Sec. 11. 46. 1 20. DEFENSES TO THEFT. (a) In a prosecution for theft 
it is a defense that the person acted under an honest claim of right in 
that 
(1) he was unaware that the property was that of another; or 
( 2) he reasonably believed that he was entitled to the prop­
erty or was authorized to dispose of it as he did. 
(b) In a prosecution for theft, it is a defense that the property 
involved is that of the defendant's spouse unless the property 
4 . 
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(1) does not constitute household belongings; or 
(2) constitutes household belongings but is the subject of 
theft while the parties are maintaining separate households and without 
a claim of right made in good faith. 
( C) In (b) of this section, "household belongings" means furniture, 
personal effects, vehicles, money, or its equivalent in amounts custo­
marily used for household purposes and other property usually found in 
and about the common dwelling and accessible to its occupants. 
( d) It is not a defense to a prosecution for theft that the person 
from whom the property was taken, appropriated, obtained or withheld 
himself obtained the property by means of theft. 
(e) ·The defendant shall have the burden of injecting the issue of 
a defense under (a) and (b) of this section. 
Sec. 11. 46. 130. THEFT IN THE FIRST DEGREE. (a) A person commits 
.the crime of theft in the first degree if he commits theft as defined in 
sec. 100 of this chapter, and 
(1) the value of the property is $500 or more; 
(2) the subject of the theft is a firearm or explosive; or 
(3) the property is taken from the person of another. 
(b) Theft in the first degree is a class C felony. 
Sec. 11. 46. 140. THEFT IN THE SECOND DEGREE. (a) A person commits 
the crime of theft in the second degree if he commits theft as defined 
in sec. 100 of this chapter and the value of the property is $50 or more 
but less than $500. 
(b) · Theft in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11. 46. 150. THEFT IN THE THIRD DEGREE. (a) A person commits 
theft in the third degree if he commits theft as defined in sec. 100 
of this chapter and the value of the property is less than $50. 
(b) Theft in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor. 
5. 
Sec. 11. 46. 160. THEFT OF LOST OR MISLAID PROPERTY. (a) A person 
commits theft of lost or mislaid property if he obtains property of 
another knowing that the property was lost, mislaid or delivered under a 
mistake as to the nature or amount of the property or the identity of 
the recipient and, with intent to deprive the.owner of the property, 
fails to take reasonable measures to restore the property to the owner. 
(b) For purposes of (a) of this section "reasonable measures" 
includes but is not necessarily limited to notifying the identified owner 
or a peace officer. 
Sec. 11. 46.180. THEFT BY DECEPTION. (a) A person commits theft 
by deception if he obtains property of another by deception. 
(b) ·rn a prosecution for theft by deception, the defendant's inten­
tion or belief that a promise would not be performed shall not be estab­
lished solely by or inferred solely from the fact that the promise was 
not performed. 
Sec. 11. 46. 190. THEFT BY RECEIVING. (a) A person commits theft 
by receiving if he buys, receives, retains, conceals or disposes of 
property of another k�owing that the property was the subject of theft. 
(b) For purposes of this section "receiving" includes, but is not 
limited to, acquiring possession, control or title, or lending on the 
security of the property. 
(c) A person whose principal business is dealing in or collecting 
used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, or his agent, em-
ployee, or representative who buys or receives property which has been 
stolen, is rebuttably presumed to have bought or received the property 
knowing it was stolen if a person in his capacity should have reasonably 
inquired as to whether the person from w�om the property was bought or 
received had the legal right to sell or deliver it, and he :failed to 
make the inquiry. 
6. 
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(d) In addition to the criminal penalty provided in secs. 130 -
150 of this chapter, a person who commits theft by receiving is liable 
in a civil action to the owner of the stolen property for three times 
the amount of actual damages sustained by him by the loss of the prop­
erty, as well as all costs and reasonable attorney fees. 
Sec. 11. 46. 195. EXTORTION. (a) A person commits the crime of 
extortion if, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriat 
property of another, he obtains property of another by threat. 
(b) In a prosecution based upon a threat as defined in sec. 990-
(10) (A) (v) of this chapter, it is an affirmative defense that the defen­
dant reasonably believed the threatened charge to be true and that his 
sole interit was to compel or induce the victim to take reasonable action 
to correct the wrong which is the subject of the threatened charge. 
(c) Extortion is a class B felony. 
Sec. 11. 46. 200. THEFT OF SERVICES. (a) A person commits the 
crime of theft of services if 
(1) he obtains services, known by him to be available only 
for compensation, by deception, physical force, threat, or other means 
to avoid payment for the services; or 
(2) having control over the disposition of services of others 
to which he is not entitled, he knowingly di_verts those services to his 
mm benefit or to the benefit of another not entitled to them. 
(b) Absconding without payment or offer to pay for hotel, res­
taurant or other services for which compensation is customarily paid 
immediately upon the receiving of them is prirna facie evidence that the 
services were obtained by deception. 
(c) Theft of services is 
(1) a class C felony if the value of the service is $500 or 
more; 
7. 
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(2) a class A misdemeanor if the value of the service is $50 
or more but less than $500; 
(3) a class B misdemeanor if the value of the service is less 
. than $50. 
Sec. 11.46.210. THEFT BY FAILURE TO MAKE REQUIRED DISPOSITION OF 
FUNDS RECEIVED OR HELD. (a) A person commits the crime of theft by 
failure to make required disposition of funds received or held when 
(1) he obtains property from anyone or personal services 
from an employee upon agreement or subject to a known legal obligation 
to make specified payment or other disposition to a third person, 
whether from that property or its proceeds or from one's own property 
to be reserved in equivalent amount; and 
(2) he exercises control over the property as his own and 
recklessly fails to make the required payment or disposition. 
(b) It is not a defense to a prosecution under (a) of this 
section that it may be impossible to identify particular property as 
bclongin8 to the victim at the time of the defendant's failure to make 
the required payment of disposition. 
(c) An officer or employee of the government or of a financial in­
s ti tut ion or a fiduciary is rebuttably presumed 
(1) to know any legal obligation relevant to his criminal 
liability under this section; and 
(2) to have dealt with the property as his own if he fails 
to pay or account upon lawful demand, or if an audit reveals a shortage 
or falsification of accounts. 
(d) Theft by failure to make required disposition of funds re­
ceived is 
more; 
(1) a class C Felony if the value of the property is $500 or 
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(2) a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property is 
$50 or more but less than $500; 
(3) a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property is 
less than $50. 
Sec. 11. L�6. 220. CONCEALMENT OF MERCHANDISE. (a) A person commits 
the crime of concealment of merchandise if without authority he know­
ingly conceals upon or about his person the goods or merchandise of a 
retail business establishment, not purchased by the person, ·while still 
upon the premises of the retail business establishment with intent to 
deprive the owner of the goods or merchandise. 
(b) Goods or merchandise found concealed upon or about the person 
which have not been purchased by the person are prima facie evidence of 
a knowing concealment. 
(c) Concealment of merchandise is 
(1) a class C felony if the value of the merchandise is $500 
or more; 
(2) a class A misdemeanor if the value of the merchandise is 
$50 or more but less than $500; 
(3) a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property is 
less than $50. 
Sec. 11.46. 230. REASONABLE DETENTION AS DEFENSE. (a) In a civil 
or criminal action b·rought by a person who has been detained on or in 
the immediate vicinity of the premises of a mercantile establishment 
for the purpose of investigation or questioning as to the ownership of 
merchandise, it is a defense that 
(1) the person was detained in a reasonable manner and for 
not more than a reasonable time to permit investigation or questioning 
by a peace officer or by the owner of the mercantile establishment, his 
authorized employee or agent; and 
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(2) that the peace officer, owner, employee or agent had 
reasonable erounds to believe that the person detained was committing 
or attempting to commit a crime as defined in sec. 220 of this chapter. 
(b) For purposes of (a) of this section: 
(1) "reasonable grounds" includes knowledge that a person 
has concealed upon or about his person unpurchased merchandise of the 
mercantile establishmerit; and 
(2) "reasonable time" means the time necessary to permit the 
person �etained to make a statement or to refuse to make a statement, 
and any additional time necessary to examine employees and records of 
the mercantile establishment relative to the ownership of the merchan­
dise. 
Sec. 11. 46. 240. UN.i\UTllORIZED USE OF A PROPELLED VEHICLE. ( a) A 
person commits the crime of-unauthorized use of a propelled vehicle if 
(1) knowing that he does not have the consent of the owner, 
he takes, operates, exercises control over or otherwise uses another's 
propelled vehicle; 
(2) havin3 custody of a propelled vehicle under an agreement 
between himself or another person and the owner of the vehicle by which 
he or another person performs for compensation a specific service in­
volving the maintenance, repair or use of the vehicle for the owner, he 
uses or operates it for his own purpose in a manner which constitutes 
an unreasonable deviation from the agreed purpose, knowing that his use 
or operation of the vehicle does not have the consent of the owner; or 
(3) having custody of a propelled vehicle under an agreement 
with the owner of the vehicle in which he has agreed to return the 
vehicle to the owner at a specified time, he knowingly retains or with­
holds possession of the vehicle without the consent of the mmer for 
so long a period beyond the time specified as to render the retention 
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or possession of the vehicle an unreasonable deviation from the agree­
ment. 
(b) The consent of the o·wner of a propelled vehicle to its use 
shall not be presumed or implied because of the owner's consent on pre­
vious occasions to its use by the same or a different person. 
(c) When a minor is accused of a violation under this section, he 
may be charged, prosecuted and sentenced in the same manner as an adult 
except that a parent, guardian or legal custodian shall be presertt at al. 
proceedings against the minor. 
(d) For purposes of this section, a "propelled vehicle" means a 
device upon which or by which a person or property is or may be trans­
ported, and which is self-propelled, including but not limited to 
automobiles, vessels, airplanes, motorcycles, snow machines, all­
terrain vehicles, sailboats and construction equipment. 
(e) Unauthorized use of a propelled vehicle is a class A 
misdemeanor. A second or subsequent violation of this section is a 
class C felony. 
Sec. 11.46. 250. UNAUTHORIZED OCCUPANCY OF A PROPELLED VEHICLE. 
(a) A person commits the crime of unauthorized occupancy of a propelled 
vehicle if he rides in a propelled vehicle which, at the time he entered 
it, he knew or had been informed that the vehicle had been stolen or 
was being used or was to be used in violation of sec. 240 of this chap­
ter. 
(b) Unauthorized occupancy of a propelled vehicle is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11. 46. 260. REMOVAL OF IDENTIFICATION MARKS. (a) A person 
commits the crime of removal of identification marks if he, with intent 
to cause interruption of the ownership of another, defaces, erases, or 
otherwise alters or attempts to deface, erase, or otherwise alter any 
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serial number or identification mark placed or inscribed on a motor 
vehicle, bicycle, firearm, movable or immovable construction tool or 
equipment, appliance, merchandise or other article or its component parts. 
(b) Removal of identification marks is 
(1) a class C felony if the value of the property on which 
the serial number or identification mark appeared is $500 or more; 
(2) a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property on 
which the serial number or identification mark appeared is $50 or more 
but less than $500; 
(3) a class n misdemeanor if the value of the property on 
which the serial number or identification mark appeared is less than $50. 
. Sec. 11. L16. 2 70. UNLAWFUL POSSESS ION. (a) A person commits the 
crime of unlawful possession if he possesses a motor vehicle, firearm, 
movable construction tool or equipment, appliance, merchandise or other 
article, or any part of one of these, knowing the serial number or 
identification mark placed on it by the manufacturer or owner for the 
purpose of identification has been erased, altered, changed or removed 
with the intent of changing the id.entity of any of these i terns• 
(b) Unlawful possession is 
(1) a class C felony if the value of the property on which 
the serial number or identification mark appeared is $500 or more; 
( 2) a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property on 
which the serial number or identification mark appeared is $50 or more 
but less than $500; 
( 3) a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property on 
which the serial number or identification mark appeared is less than $50. 
Sec. 11.46.280. ISSUING A BAD CHECK. 
12. 
[RESERVED] 
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
Chapter 46. Offenses Against Property 
ARTICLE 1. THEFT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
COMMENTARY 
The Effect of the Revised Code Provisions on the Existing 
Law of Theft and Related Offenses 
In providing for a consolidated theft statute, the 
Theft and Related Offenses Article of the Revised Code elimi­
nates many of the artificial and highly technical distinctions 
among the various methods in which theft may be committed. 
This change will affect judges, prosecutors, defendants and 
defense attorneys in the following manner: 
1. Neither trial nor appellate judges will be forced to 
make delicate distinctions among the most typical 
forms of thievish conduct. These distinctions 
arose over 500 years ago as part of the development 
of common law larceny but serve no useful purpose 
in the twentieth century. These highly technical 
and unnecessary distinctions have been repudiated 
in most jurisdictions, including Oregon, the state 
from which our existing theft laws were derived in 
1899. 
2. Prosecutors will be protected against a finding 
that their proof at trial differed from the 
particular form of theft charged. The potential 
for successive trials, the first based upon one 
13. 
theory of larceny and the second on another, will 
be all but eliminated. 
3. Defendants and defense attorneys will not be 
confronted with a confusing assortment of statu­
tory crimes, artificial and arbitrary distinctions 
between related offenses, and irrationally incon­
sistent penalties. 
SECTION ANALYSIS OF REVISED CODE 
I. TD AS 11. 46. 100 - THEFT DEFINED 
A. Existing Law 
The basic theft offense under existing law is 
larceny of money or property, AS 11. 20. 140, which provides 
that "[a] person who steals money, goods, or chattels • . .  
which is the property of another, is guilty of larceny. "  At 
first reading this statute appears to be a model of brevity 
and clarity. However, the crime of larceny has a common 
law history stretching back hundreds of years to medieval 
England. The Alaska Supreme Court has had to delve into this 
history to explain exactly what it means to "steal" something. 
The term " larceny" has not been defined in 
any of the Alaska statutes treating of that 
subject, so the common law may be looked to 
for a definition . . .  [Larceny is the] 
wrongful or felonious taking and carrying 
away of the personal goods of another with 
the intent to permanently deprive the owner 
of his property tht•rein. 
Mahle v. State, 392 P. 2d 19 (AK 1964) . 
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While most of the elements of larceny listed in 
Mahle have been litigated over and explained through the 
years, appeals are still necessary to determine the scope of 
the larceny statute. As recently as 1974, for example, the 
Alaska Supreme Court has had to read briefs and hear arguments 
before holding that the "property of another" element does 
not require that property be taken from the owner; stealing 
from one who is merely in possession of the property is 
sufficient. Pulakis v. State, 476 P. 2d 474 (AK 1970). Thus, 
at a time when the Court's caseload is increasing by approxi­
mately 20% a year, valuable court time must be devoted to 
clarify blackletter law. Indeed, prior to the revision of 
the Oregon Criminal Code in 1971, the Oregon Supreme Court 
in State v. Harris, 427 P. 2d 107, 108 (Ore. 1967) , noted that 
the now repealed Oregon theft statutes served no useful 
purpose and adversely affected the administration of justice: 
This is another appeal caused by Oregon's 
outdated criminal statutes. We are required 
to draw a fine distinction between larceny 
and embezzlement because such a distinction 
was drawn by the· Eighteenth Century English 
Courts and incorporated into the Oregon 
statutes by Mathew Deady in Oregon's first 
code. This distinction serves no purpose 
whatsoever in the Twentieth Century . 
(footnote omitted. ) 
" 
As noted in the Preface to Tentative Draft, Part 1, 
the existing Alaska statutes in this area are primarily based 
on the now repealed Oregon provisions. 
In addition to the basic offense of larceny, the 
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current Alaska statutes include at least fifteen other 
provisions which cover wrongful taking of the property of 
another. Many of the differences among these statutes are 
based on the type of property taken. For example, the 
larceny statute, AS 11. 20.140, prohibits the "stealing " of 
money, goods, or chattels, or a government note, 
a bank note, promissory note, bill of exchange, 
bond, or other thing in action, or a book of 
accounts, order or certificate concerning money 
or goods due or to become due or to be delivered, 
or a deed or writing containing a conveyance of 
land or interest in land, or a bill of sale, or 
writing containing a conveyance of goods or chattels 
or interest in them, or any other valuable contract 
in force, or a receipt, release, or defeasance, or 
a writ, process, or public record. 
This extensive listing is necessary because only 
money, goods and chattels could be the subjects of larceny 
at common law. §tate v. Tauscher, 360 P. 2d 764 (Ore 1961). 
In addition, Alaska also nas separate �catutes 
prohibiting theft of animals, AS 1 1. 20. 160; aircraft parts, 
AS 1 1. 20. 525; minerals, AS 11. 20. 190; " lost property", 
AS 11.20. 260; and "public money ", AS 11. 20. 300. A separate 
provision covers larceny occurring in a building or vessel, 
AS 11. 2 0 . 15 0 . 
Existing Alaska law also retains the ancient 
distinctions between larceny, embezzlement and obtaining 
property by false pretenses although these distinctions serve 
no practical purpose. One commentator, after surveying the 
theft statutes in the United States almost 20 years ago noted: 
[I] f we examine the criminal statutes of almost 
any state, we find the ancient hands of the 
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Anglo-Saxons and Normans stretch across the 
centuries and dominate large sections of our 
criminal law today. . . Thus the modern 
American statutes, with rare exception, are 
of a piece with the legislation that started as 
far back as the thirteenth century. They are not 
based upon an analysis of the entire problem but 
represent cumulative narrow amendments to the 
common law where gaps existed or developed. The 
present substantive criminal law is the result of 
historical accidents which gave rise to specific 
formulas, a particularistic method of legislation, 
and the spinning of tenuous, complicated techni­
calities from the plethora of case material which 
arose in the last two centuries. [Footnotes 
ommitted]. 
J. Hall, Theft, Law and Society 98 (2d ed 1952). 
The effect of these "historical accidents" on 
existing law is highlighted by Professors Wayne LaFave and 
Austin Scott: 
We have seen that English legal history 
explains the fact that, in most American 
jurisdictions today, the wrongful appropriation 
of another's property is covered by three related 
but separate, non-overlapping crimes--larceny, 
embezzlement and false pretenses. This fact, 
together with the fact that the borderlines 
between the three crimes are thin and often 
difficult to draw, has given rise to a favorite 
indoor sport played for high stakes in our 
appellate courts: A defendant, convicted of one 
of the three crimes, claims on appeal that, 
though he is guilty of a crime, his crime is 
one of the other two. Sometimes this pleasant 
game is carried to extremes: A defendant, 
charged with larceny, is acquitted by the trial 
court (generally on the defendant's motion for 
a directed verdict of acquittal) on the ground 
that the evidence shows him guilty of embezzle­
ment. Subsequently tried for embezzlement, he 
is convicted; but he appeals on the ground that 
the evidence proves larceny rather than embezzle­
ment. The appellate court agrees and reverses 
the conviction. [Footnotes ommitted]. 
LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law 673 (1972). 
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Today, 42 states have either adopted or are 
considering revised criminal codes. Virtually all of these 
revisions have repudiated the unnecessary and outdated dis­
tinctions among the most common theft offenses. The Theft and 
Related Offenses Article of the Revised Code accomplishes 
this result in Alaska. 
B. The Revised Code 
1. Consolidation of Theft Offenses 
The primary purpose of the Theft Offense Article 
of the Revised Code is the consolidation of a number of crimes 
which have traditionally been thought of as theft offenses. 
The traditionally distinct crimes of larceny, larceny by 
trick, embezzlement, theft of mislaid property, obtaining 
property by false pretenses and receiving stolen property are 
now combined into the single crime of "theft". Theft is 
divided for purposes of punishment into three degrees depending 
on the value of the property stolen and certain other aggravat­
ing factors. 
Theft is defined in TD AS 11. 46. 100. Because 
a substantial portion of the conduct described in this section 
has not been included within the common law definition of 
larceny, the conduct is labelled as " theft" to avoid any 
implication that the consolidated theft statute is limited 
by the scope of common law larceny. 
The structure of TD AS 11. 46. 100 is two-fold: 
the first part of the section describes the culpable mental 
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state with which the defendant must act to commit theft 
while subsections ( 1) - ( 4) describe the act of theft. There­
fore, the crime of theft is committed when any of the acts 
listed in the subsections (1) - ( 4) is committed with the 
culpable mental state of "intent to deprive another of 
property or to appropriate property of another to himself or 
to a third person. " 
Subsection (1) , referring to a person who "takes, 
appropriates, obtains or withholds the property of another" 
with the requisite intent is broad enough to cover all forms 
of thievish conduct. See, State v. Jim/White, 508 P. 2d 430 
(Or. App. 1973) , interpreting the identical language in the 
Oregon consolidated theft statute . However, as a concession 
to the potential hold of tradition, subsections ( 2) - ( 4) 
specifically list conduct traditionally not included within 
the definition Qf common law larceny. 
Subsections ( 2) - ( 4) refer the reader to specific 
statutes describing in detail how theft of lost property, 
theft by deception and theft by receiving may be committed. 
It is important to note that the conduct described in these 
specific statutes do not create separate crimes. Conduct 
described in Theft by Deception, TD AS 11. 46. 180, for example, 
is Theft under TD AS 11. 46. 100, and depending on the value of 
the property involved will be punished as theft in the first, 
second or thirq degree. There is no separate offense of theft 
by deception in the Revised Code. 
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The definitions of " appropriate" and "deprive" , 
TD AS 1 1. 46. 990 (1) and (3) , are used in determining the 
requisite intent on the part of the defendant to commi t  
theft. The thrust of the definitions of " deprive" and 
"appropriate" is that they require a purpose on the part of 
the defendant to exert permanent or virtually permanent 
control over the property, or to cause permanent or virtually 
permanent loss to the owner of the possession or use of the 
property. Consistent with existing law, i t  is this feature 
that distinguishes theft from some other offenses which, while 
similar to theft, are satisfied by an intent to obtain only 
temporary possessi on or use of property or to cause temporary 
loss to the owner, (e. g. , TD AS 11. 46. 240,  Unauthorized Use 
of Propelled Vehicle) . 
The definition of "obtain", TD AS 11. 46. 990 ( 6) ,  
extends the concept of taking to include constructive acquisi­
tion of property and is consistent with the definition of 
" property" ; TD AS 11. 46. 990 (7) , which includes real property. 
Because asportation or " carrying away" of property is not 
an element of theft under the consolidated theft statute, 
theft of real property is possible under the Revised Code, 
even though it was not i ncluded within the common law crime 
of larceny. 
The question of what can be the subject of larceny 
is resolved in existing law by an extensive, specific listing 
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of various items which could not be the subj ect of larceny 
at common law because they are " intangibles" documents 
reflecting a right to possession of property but not considered 
property in themselves by English j udges in the 1500's. The 
Revised Code simply prohibits theft of " property" ,  which is 
defined broadly in TD AS 11.46. 990 (7) as " an article , subs tance 
or thing of value . .  
examples of property , 
" The definition then lists several 
including intangible property , real 
property and evidence of debt or contract. The inclusion of 
commodities of a public utility nature such as gas , electricity , 
steam and water with:i;n the definition of "property " insures . that 
a person commits theft , for example,  when he takes water from 
a reservoir or gas from a storage tank. If , however , the 
taking of the commodity occurs in the more typical manner of 
a homeowner tampering with his water or electric meter , theft 
of services , TD AS 11. 46. 200 , infra , has occurred. 
The Revised Code requires that for theft to occur 
the defendant must obtain the "property of another" .  
TD AS 11. 46. 990 (8) defines " property of another" as "property 
in which a person has possession or an i nterest upon which the 
actor is not privileged to infringe. " In recognizing 
that theft may occur "whether or not the actor also has an 
interest in the property , "  the definition embodies the policy 
that co-owners of property should be as well protected against 
depredations by other co-owners as they are against outsiders. 
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With regard to property subject to a security interest, 
the Revised Code recognizes that possession of the property is 
the most important factor , and provides that one who has such 
possession has not committed theft if he withholds the property 
from the secured party. Further, in the absence of a specific 
agreement to the contrary, a secured parLy commits theit if it 
repossesses property without the consent of the party in posses­
sion. The Revised Code will cover conduct which defrauds 
secured creditors in Article 5 of this chapter, Business and 
Commercial Offenses. 
II. TD AS 11. 46. 110. CONSOLIDATION OF THEFT OFFENSES: 
PLEADING AND PROOF 
TD AS 11. 46. 110 spells out the procedural conse­
quences of the consolidation of theft offenses. Under the 
Revised Code a charge of theft is sufficient without desig­
nating the particular means by which the property was obtained. 
The section serves to underscore one of the chief aims of 
the theft article: elimination of the confusing distinctions 
among the most typical theft offenses in existing law. 
The necessity for this section was acknowledged by 
the primary drafter of the Oregon Revised Criminal Code. 
As noted by the Model Penal Code reporters, 
despite the substantive consolidation of the 
theft offenses " . . .  the tendency to cling 
to the old categories is so strong that it is 
considered advisable to state expressly what 
logically follows . .  " The [ Revised Code] , 
anticipating this possibility, contains a 
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special section detailing the procedural conse­
quences of the consolidation of theft offenses . 
It provides that a charge of theft is sufficient 
withou t designating the particular theory of the 
crime. . Thus, the state will not be required 
in most cases, to designate the particular way or 
manner in which the crime was committed. A general 
a llegation that the defendant committed theft of 
property of the nature or value required for the 
commission of the particular crime will be sup­
portable by proof that he engaged in conduct con­
stituting theft as defined by the [Revised Code] . 
The proof might be that the defendant engaged in 
conduct amounting to common law larceny, " embez­
zlement, " "theft by receiving, " or some other 
type of theivish conduct. [ Footnotes ommitted] . 
Paillette, The Oregon Theft Laws : Consolidation v. 
Conglomeration, 51 ORE. L. REV. 5 25 (1972) . 
III. TD AS 11.46. 120. DEFENSES TO THEFT . 
The Revised Code provides in subsection ( a }  that a 
person does not commit theft if he acts under an honest claim 
of right. This section is consistent with existing law which 
recognizes that larceny occurs only if property is taken " with 
intent to deprive the owner" of property . If the defendant 
honestly believes that he is entitled to the property he has 
not acted with the required intent . TD AS ll. 46. 120 { a) 
codifies this "claim of right" doctrine, with the additional 
requirement that not only must the defendant honestly believe 
in his claim, but his belief must be a "reasonable" one. 
Subsection (b) modifies the common law rule that 
the legal unity of husband and wife prevents one spouse from . 
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committing theft against the other. In the Revised Code, 
the spousal defense to theft applies only if the property is 
"household belongings" as defined in subsection ( re) .  Further , 
even if household belongings are the subject of theft, a 
spouse can still be guilty of theft if separate households 
are being maintained and the taking is not based on a claim 
of right made in good faith. This approach leaves most property 
disputes between spouses to the divorce courts , but at the 
same time provides criminal sanctions in those situations 
where the separate property rights of a spouse require the 
protection of the criminal law. 
In subsection (d) the Revised Code specifically 
recognizes that it is not a defense that the defendant obtained 
property from a person who himself obtained the property by 
theft. Thus, theft may be committed even though the victim 
himself was a thief. 
IV. TD AS 11. 46.130- 150. THEFT IN THE FlRST, SECOND OR
THIRD DEGREE 
A. Existing Law
The inconsistency of the penalty provisions throughout
the existing criminal code is qighlighted in the theft offenses 
area. For example, while larceny is aggravated to a felony 
when the value of the property exceeds $250, (AS 11. 20. 140) , 
embezzlement becomes a felony when the value exceeds $100, 
24.
(AS 11.20.290). When an animal is stolen, a felony is committed 
when the value of the animal exceeds $50, (AS 11.20.160), while 
the theft of certain minerals, regardless of value, is always a 
felony, (AS 11.20.190). Further, the maximum penalty for a 
theft of a cow worth more than $50 (and what respectable cow 
in Alaska is not worth· $50) is ten years, (AS 11.20.160), while 
the maximum penalty for extortion, for example, is only five, 
(AS 11.20.345). 
B. The Code Provision
Under the Revised Code, the consolidated offense of
theft, as well as all related theft offenses except extortion, 
are divided into three degrees for sentencing purposes. While 
theft is defined in TD AS 11.46.100, the three degrees of the 
crime of theft are set out in TD AS 11.46.130-150. 
1. Theft in the First Degree
The crime of Theft in the First Degree, a Class C 
felony, is committed if any of the three circumstances listed 
in TD AS ll.46.130(a) exists. 
Paragraph (1) provides that Theft in the First 
Degree is committed if the value of the property stolen is 
$500 or more. While the setting of any dollar figure as 
the basis of a distinction between felony and misdemeanor 
theft is by necessity somewhat arbitrary, the Subcommission 
considered the experience of other states as well as crime 
statistics in Alaska in arriving at this figure. While 
Oregon in 1971 set the figure at $200, the more recent Proposed 
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Arizona Revised Code used a $1,000 breaking point. Further, 
a sample totalling 523 reported theft complaints in the city 
of Anchorage for the first eleven months of 1975 revealed that 
approximately 30% involved property valued over $500. 
Using the Oregon figure as a starting point, and 
considering the rate of inflation since 1971 as well as the 
higher cost of living in Alaska, the $500 figure seems 
reasonable when applied to a Revised Code which will not be 
effective until after 1977. · The $500 felony breaking point 
is also used in the existing Alaska Credit Card Crimes Act, 
AS 11. 22. 
Paragraph (2) provides that theft of a firearm or 
explosive is always Theft in the First Degree. This provision 
was included because of the frequency with which stolen fire­
arms and explosives are used in other crimes. Further, the 
possibility of harm resulting from such a theft will usually 
exceed the value of the firearm or explosive. 
Paragraph (3) provides that theft of any amount 
of property from the person of another is treated as first 
degree theft. This is consistent with existing AS 11.15.250, 
Larceny from a Person, which treats non-forcible theft from 
the person (i.e., picking a pocket) as a felony, regardless 
of the value of the property stolen. 
Thefts involving the actual or threatened imminent 
use of force are treated even more severely as Robbery, 
TD AS 11.41.500, 510, a Class A or B felony. Similarly, 
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theft accomplished by a threat to inflict harm in the future 
is treated as Extortion, TD AS 11.46.195, infra, which is a 
Class B felony regardless of the value of the property taken. 
2. Theft in the Second and Third Degrees 
Under the Revised Code, theft of property worth 
less than $500 which is not aggravated by factors included 
in theft in the first degree, is a misdemeanor. 
Theft of property worth between $50 and $500 is 
theft in the second degree, a Class A misdemeanor. Theft in 
the third degree, a B misdemeanor, is committed by taking 
property worth less than $50. This division was made to 
reflect the conclusion that there is a need for a crime below 
traditional petty theft to insure that a defendant is not 
potentially liable for a full year's imprisonment for theft 
involving property worth $50 or less. 
3. Value of Property - TD AS 11.46.980 
Because the degree of theft is primarily determined 
by the value of the property stolen, the Revised Code in 
TD AS 11.46. 980 sets out specific rules to be used in determin­
ing the value of property. 
Subsection (a) provides that "value" will ordinarily 
mean the market value of the property at the time of the theft. 
If this cannot reasonably be ascertained, "value" means the 
cost of replacing the property. 
Subsection (b) (1) provides that the value of a written 
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instrument constituting an evidence of debt, such as a check, 
draft, or promissory note, shall be considered the amount 
due or collectible thereon. Pursuant to subsection (b) (2), 
the value of any other written instrument shall be considered 
the greatest amount of economic loss which the owner might 
reasonably suffer because of the theft. 
Subsection (c) provides that amounts involved in criminal 
acts committed under one course of conduct are to be aggregated 
in determining the degree of theft. The following commentary 
from§ 3201 of the Proposed Michigan Revised Code examines 
this provision at p. 222: 
[Subsection (c)] permits the cumulation of 
small amounts taken from the same or several 
persons pursuant to one . . course of 
conduct. . As an example of its applica-
tion, a bus driver or several bus drivers might 
pursue a scheme in which each day he or they 
would withhold not more than two or three 
dollars from the day's receipts. Or a transient 
operator might move from house to house in a 
neighborhood promising to seal roofs at $65 
a roof, either absconding with the payment or 
dabbing at the roof with a few cents worth of 
tar. In either instance the employer, the 
householder and the community incur substantial 
financial loss. The . . course of 
conduct is calculated enough that it 
suggests a need for a substantial term of 
imprisonment or a period under probation. 
However, so long as each taking is con-
sidered a separate offense all the acts 
will be in the misdemeanor category only 
. By aggregating the amounts, the 
defendant may be brought into the felony 
range of punishments . . 
VI. TD AS 11. 46. 160. THEFT OF LOST OR MISLAID PROPERTY 
A. Existing Law 
One of the most serious defects with the existing 
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criminal code is that some of its provisions cannot be 
enforced because of constitutional infirmities. An example 
of this situation is the existing statute in this area, 
AS 11. 20.260, Retention of Lost Property. Two years ago, in 
State v. Campbell, 536 P.2d 105 (AK 1975) , the Alaska Supreme 
Court held this statute unconstitutional because it did not 
include any requirement of criminal intent. In that case the 
Court cited with approval the Oregon lost property statute, 
ORS 164.065, which required criminal intent. The Alaska 
statute has not been revised since Campbell was decided. 
B. The Code Provision 
Pursuant to TD AS 11.46.100(2) r a person commits ThPf� 
if he satisfies the requirements set out in theft of lost or 
mislaid property, TD AS 11 . 46. 160. 
The requirements of this statute are (1) the 
defendant's obtaining of property (2) knowing it to have been 
lost, mislaid or delivered to him by mistake and (3) failing 
to take reasonable measures to restore the property to its 
owner (4) with intent to deprive the owner of the property. 
Subsection (b) specifically lists notification of a peace 
officer or the owner as a "reasonable measure" to restore 
the property. 
The intent requirement included by TD AS 11.46.160 
cures the constitutional defect in the present theft of lost 
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property statute cited by the court in Campbell, supra. 
The following commentary from the Model Penal Code 
details the type of fact situation in which the section 
would apply: 
Common law theory of larceny as an infringe-
ment of another's possession required a deter­
mination of the actor's state of mind at the 
moment of finding, for an honest state of mind 
at that point would preclude the felony convic­
tion; the subsequent formation of a dishonest 
purpose would not be criminal since he would 
already be in possession. The search for an 
initial fraudulent intent appears to be largely 
make-believe. The realistic objective in this 
area is not to prevent the initial appropriation 
but to compel subsequent acts to restore to the 
owner. Therefore the section permits conviction 
even where the original taking was honest in the 
sense that the finder then intended to restore, 
but subsequently changed his mind; and it bars 
conviction where the finder acts with reasonable 
promptness to restore the property, even though 
he may have entertained a fraudulent purpose at 
some time during his possession. (Tent. Draft No. 2 
at 83-84). 
VIL TD AS 11.46 . 180. THEFT BY DECEPTION 
A. Existing Law 
There are at least six existing Alaska statutes 
providing for the punishment of obtaining property by deception 
or fraud. 
AS 11.20.360 restates the common law crime of 
Larceny by False Pretenses. The crime of obtaining property 
by false pretenses is a statutory offense made necessary because 
of the strict technical requirements of common law larceny. 
For larceny it was necessary that possession of property be ob�­
tained. However, if the victim, even though fraudulently induced, 
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willingly parted with title to the property then possession 
went with it, and the defendant was not guilty of converting 
property that was in the legal possession of another. See, 
2 R. Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure 
§§ 580-620 (1957). 
The elements of �arceny by F.alse Pretenses include 
a false representation of past or existing facts and an intent 
to defraud. Statements pertaining to what would occur in the 
future or expressions of opinion would not support a conviction. 
State v. Pearce, 7 Alaska 246 (1924). 
AS 11.20.200, forrn�rly Larceny by Trick or False 
Personation, restated the different common law crime of 
larceny by trick, but was amended in 1976 to include larceny 
accomplished by a "false or fraudulent representation or 
pretense." Consequently, the readers of this report will 
mercifully be spared the reliving of medieval arguments over 
the difference between Larceny by Trick and Larceny by False 
Pretenses. 
AS 11. 20.390, Fraudulent Conveyance, prohibits a 
particular type of false pretense - executing a conveyance 
of land while knowingly and falsely representing that he has 
a lawful interest in that land. AS 11.20.450 prohibits the 
obtaining of property by the particular strategem of falsely 
representing himself to be an agent of an organization, such 
as the United Way. 31. 
AS 11.20.400, Fraudulent Sale of Personalty Subject 
to a Security Interest, prohibits conveyances, with intent to 
defraud, of property which is subject to a security interest 
without informing the buyer of the security interest. 
AS 11.20 . 480 prohibits the procuring of "fare, board, 
lodging or lodging services, food, drink or merchandise" from 
a "hotel, inn, boardinghouse, lodginghouse, campground or 
trailer court" by a false pretense. 
Finally, the Alaska Consumer Protection Act, 
AS 45.50.471, punishes various types of deceptive practices 
used by business against consumers. 
Most of the existing statutes cited above include 
as an element an "intent to defraud", which is not defined in 
any Alaskan statute or court decision. Presumably the courts 
rely on the common law definition of " intent to defraud." 
B. The Code Provision 
The Revised Code provides in TD AS 11.46.990 (2) 
for a broad definition of "deception," which allows most of 
the current statutes in this area to be replaced by TD AS 
11.46.180, Theft by Deception. This statute provides simply 
that a person commits theft if, acting with the requisite intent 
set forth in TD AS 11.46.100, commits theft if "he obtains 
property of another by deception . "  To insure that the 
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criminal courts are not swamped with cases which 
should be treated as civil breach of contract claims, 
subsection (b) requires that "deception" be established by 
more than a mere showing that the defendant's promise was not 
kept. 
"Deception " is defined in TD AS 11. 46.990 (2) so as 
to cover five possible situations. Paragraph (i) codifies 
the traditional false pretenses concept of knowingly creating 
a false impression, and broadens the scope to include the act 
of confirming another's impression which the defendant 
does not believe to be true. The false impression may relate 
to law, value, intention or other state of mind. The traditional 
restriction to "existing fact" is rejected, as is the traditional 
requirement of a "false token. " 
If the defendant knowingly fails to correct a false 
impression which he has previously created he has committed 
"deception" under paragraph (ii) . 
Paragraph (iii) provideg that deception also occurs 
when a seller knowingly prevents a buyer from acquiring 
relevant information. 
Paragraph (iv) reaches the conduct covered currently 
by Fraudulent Sale of Property Subject to a Security Interest, 
AS 11.20.400 - conveying an interest in property failing to 
disclose a claim which impairs the enjoyment of the property. 
Paragraph (v) provides that a person obtains 
property by "deception" if he promises performance which he 
intends or knows will not be performed. The original promise 
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is actually the creating of a "false impression" under 
paragraph (i). However, it is advisable to provide specif­
ically for theft by a false promise to emphasize that the 
common law restriction to "existing facts" cannot be interpreted 
to exempt false promises from the coverage of the theft statute. 
TD AS ll. 46.990 (B) provides that " deception" 
does not include falsity as to matters having no pecuniary 
significance, such as a false statement by a car salesman 
that he belongs to the Elks in order to sell a car to an 
enthusiastic Elk. Subsection (B) also provides that "deception" 
does not include "puffing" by statements unlikely to deceive 
ordinary persons in the group addressed. An example of "puffing"' 
would be a salesman's statement that "this shampoo will make 
persons of the opposite sex fall all over you." 
The definition of "deception" used in the consolidated 
theft statute insures that appropriately severe penalties will 
be available for the criminal prosecution of all cases invcilving 
theft accomplished by deception, especially in the area of 
consumer frauds. 
VIII. TD AS 11. 46.190. THEFT BY RECEIVING 
A. Existing Law 
Existing AS 11. 20. 350 provides for a maximum three 
year sentence for a person who "buys, receives, or conceals 
money, goods, bank notes or other thing which may be the 
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subject of larceny and which has been taken, embezzled, or 
stolen from another person, knowing it to have been taken, 
embezzled or stolen. " A person in the business of dealing 
in secondhand goods is rebuttably presumed to know that 
property is stolen if he fails to make reasonable inquiries 
as to whether the person from whom he buys the property had 
the legal right to sell it. 
B. The Code Provision 
Theft by receiving is the final theft-related 
offense included within the consolidated theft statute. 
TD AS 11. 46 . 190 supplements the existing language 
"buys, receives, or conceals" with "retains" and "disposes of" 
property of another. Subsection (b) provides exa�ples of 
"receiving", emphasizing that "receiving" includes knowingly 
taking stolen property as security for a loan, as in a pawnshop. 
The Revised Code includes the present requirement 
that the receiver "know " the property was stolen. The definition 
of "knowing" is discussed in Tentative Draft, Part 2 at 15. 
"Knowing'' includes the deliberate avoidance of knowledge by 
refusing to check out facts which would prompt a reasonable 
person to investigate. 
Subsection (c) retains the present presumption of 
knowledge by secondhand dealers, while subsection (d) is 
derived directly from AS ll. 20. 350(c) . 
Commentary from the Oregon Revised Criminal Code 
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emphasizes the advantages of including theft by receiving 
within a consolidated theft statute: 
Consolidation of receiving with other forms of 
theft provides the same advantages as other aspects 
of the unification of the theft concept. It reduces 
the opportunity for technical defenses based upon 
legal distinctions between the similar activities of 
stealing and receiving the fruits of the theft. 
It should be noted, however, that consolidation 
would make it impossible to convict of two offenses 
based on the same transaction. A person found in 
possession of recently stolen property may be either 
the thief or the receiver; but if the prosecution 
can prove the requisite thieving state of mind, it 
makes little difference whether the jury infers that 
the defendant took directly from the owner or 
acquired from the thief. 
ORS§ 164.095, Commentary at 173. 
IX. TD AS 11.46.195. EXTORTION 
A. Existing Law 
The existing extortion statute, AS 11.20.345, prohibits 
the obtaining of property by any of the threats specified in 
that section. While many theft offenses in existing law provide 
a maximum ten year sentence, theft by extortion, which is a 
more serious offense in that it involves a threat against the 
victim, provides for a maximum sentence of only 5 years. 
Subsection (b) of the existing statute provides that 
it is a defense to certain types of extortion that the property 
obtained was honestly claimed as restitution or indemnification 
for harm done in the circumstances to which the threat relates, 
or as compensation for property or lawful services. The defense 
is available only if the property was obtained by a threat to 
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(2) accuse anyone of a criminal offense; 
(3) expose confidential information or a secret, 
whether true or false, tending to subject a person to 
hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair his credit 
or business repute; 
(4) take or withold action as a public official, 
or cause a public official to take or withold action. 
B. The Code Provision 
While some recent code revisions have included theft 
by extortion within a consolidated theft statute, extortion, 
by reason of its closer analogy to robaery, is subject to a 
higher penalty than other forms of theft. Consequently, though 
technically part of a consolidated theft statute, exemptions 
are made which have the effect of removing it from the statute 
[e. g. ORS 164. 025(1), " except for the crime of theft by 
extortion, conduct denominated theft . . . constitutes a single 
offense" and ORS 164.025(2) , if an "element of the crime 
charged that property was taken by extortion, an accusation of 
theft must so specify." See, also, New York Penal Law§ 155.45]. 
Because extortion carries a heavier penalty than 
theft, and because defenses which apply to theft are inapplic­
able to extortion (i.e., claim of right), the Revised Code 
treats extortion as a separate crime. 
Nevertheless, if a defendant is charged with theft, 
but not extortion, and at trial it is established that the 
theft was accomplished by threat, the defendant can be found 
guilty of Theft. TD AS 11. 46. 100(1) . In such a case, the 
defendant would be subject to the penalty structure for theft 
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and not the higher penalty for extortion. This would be 
identical to the result in states where extortion is part of 
a consolidated theft statute. 
The kinds and varieties of threats that would amount 
to extortion are set forth in TD AS 11.46.990 (10). The Revised 
Code covers essentially the same conduct as the existing provi­
sion, but includes more examples of the prohibited types of 
threats. Most of the newly listed threats would probably be 
covered by existing ll.20.345 (a) (7), which prohibits obtaining 
property by a threat to " inflict any other harm which would not 
benefit the person making the threat or suggestion. " A similar 
provision appears in TD AS 11.46. 990 (10) (A) (x). 
Extortion may be accomplished by a threat to cause 
physical injury in the future which distinguishes it from 
Robbery, which requires a threat to use imminent physical 
force. TD AS 11.41.SOO (a). 
Subsection (b) narrows the defense to extortion 
provided by existing law. The defense of intent to compel 
the threatened person to correct a wrong is available only 
if the threat is to accuse another of a crime. The denial 
of this defense to one who threatens to expose confidential 
information or take action as a public offi6ial reflects the 
decision of the Subcommission that threats in such circum­
stances are not legitimate weapons of negotiation. 
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X. TD AS 11.46.200. THEFT OF SERVICES 
A. Existing Law 
Theft of services is traditionally treated as a 
separate offense from larceny because services such as labor 
and the supplying of food are not considered_"property." 
Existing Alaska law punishes the unlawful appropriation of 
services in at least six different statutes. 
AS 11.20.200, Larceny by Trick, makes unlawful the 
obtaining of property or labor by the proscribed means. 
AS 11.20.480, the "defrauding an innkeeper" statute, covers 
primarily the theft of services such as hotel accommodations 
or food. AS 11.20.495 prohibits the obtaining of tele­
communications services by fraud. AS 42. 20. 030 (7) also 
prohibits the obtaining of telecommunications services, as 
well as electricity and gas, if it is accomplished by tapping 
the transmission lines or other means of diversion. 
B. The Code Provision 
The purpose of TD AS 11.46.200 is to protect both 
individuals and commercial enterprises that supply services 
to the public from the thievish type of conduct now only 
partly covered by existing statutes. Theft of services is 
not part of the consolidated theft statute, which applies 
only to the obtaining of " property. " 
" Services" is defined broadly in TD AS 11. 46. 9 90 
to include all the types of services specifically mentioned 
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in the existing statutes but, in addition, it specifically 
covers theft of labor and professional services: 
''services" includes but is not necessarily 
limited to labor, professional services, 
transportation, telephone or other communi­
cations service, entertainment, the supplying 
of food, lodging or other accommodations in 
hotels, restaurants or elsewhere, admission 
to exhibitions and the supplying of equip­
ment for use; 
An additional reason for not treating theft of 
services in the consolidated theft statute is that the 
means used to steal services are different from the means 
used in other thefts. Theft of services is committed when 
the defendant obtains a service known by him to be available 
only for compensation, but somehow avoids payment for the 
service. It can also be committed by knowingly diverting 
services under his control to the benefit of someone not 
entitled to them. At trial the state must prove only that 
the defendant engaged in the conduct just described with the 
required knowledge - there is no additional requirement that 
"intent to appropriate or deprive'' be proved. 
Subsection (a) (1) covers the obtaining of services 
by " deception, physical force, threat or other means to avoid 
payment for the services." Enforceability is simplified by 
subsection (b), which provides that absconding without 
offering to pay for hotel, restaurant or other similar services 
is prima facie evidence that the services were obtained by 
deception. This subsection is based on existing AS ll. 20. 480 (b). 
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Paragraph (a) (2) provides, for example, that 
the foreman of a painting crew who has his subordinates paint 
his house on company time commits Theft of Services from his 
employer. 
Theft of Services is graded for punishment purposes 
according to the value of the service obtained in the same 
manner as the three degrees of theft discussed at§ IV, supra. 
XI . TD AS 11. 46. 210. THEFT BY FAILURE TO MAKE REQUIRED 
DISPOSITION OF FUNDS RECEIVED OR HELD 
Existing criminal law probably does not provide 
for the punishment of one who receives property by promising 
to dispose of it in a certain way, and benefits by failing to 
fulfill the obligation. The most typical examples are the 
employer who withholds amounts from his employees' pay for 
taxes or the United Fund, or the storekeeper who receives 
contributions for charity later to be transmitted by check 
to the ultimate charity recipient, and simply keeps the money. 
This form of conduct is not included in the con­
solidated definition of theft because theft by failure to 
make required disposition of funds received does not require 
a specific intent to deprive or appropriate the property. 
Instead, all the defendant must do is deal with the property 
as his own and recklessly fail to make the required payment. 
The conduct described by subsection (a) (1) is criminal 
only if the holder of the funds knows of his legal obligation 
to pay. Enforcement of this section is simplified by a 
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rebuttable presumption in subsection (c) that an employee or 
officer of the " government" or a "financial institution" or a 
" fiduciary" knows his relevant legal obligations. The terms 
" financial institution" and "government" are defined in 
TD AS 11.46.990(4) and (5). The term fiduciary will be defined 
in Article 5, Business and Commercial Offenses. Such a person 
is also presumed to have dealt with the held funds as his own 
if he fails to account for the funds on lawful demand, or if 
an audit reveals a shortage or falsification of accounts. 
Subsection (b) provides an exception to the rule 
that requires the stolen property to be specifically identified. 
A person who violates this section will not escape conviction 
simply because he has mingled the victim's money with his own 
funds. 
As in the case of the three degrees of theft, 
punishment varies according to the value of the property 
affected by the criminal act. 
XII. TD AS 11. 46.220. CONCEALMENT OF MERCHANDISE 
A. Existing Law 
The shoplifting statute currently appears at 
AS 11. 2 0 . 2 7 5 . It provides that a person commits a misdemeanor 
with a maximum 6 month sentence if he conceals on his person 
property of any value in a store with intent to deprive the 
owner. A second or subsequent conviction may result in a 
maximum of one year's imprisonment. 
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B. The Code Provision 
TD AS 11.220 restates the existing law, but punishes 
the crime with the identical three degree penalty structure 
used in theft. Thus, a shoplifter who conceals jewelry 
worth $500 or more is guilty of a felony under the Revised 
Code. The felony penalty for shoplifting property worth more 
than $500 is new to existing law. However, currently the 
prosecution may attempt to prosecute particularly outrageous 
shoplifting cases under AS 11. 20.150, Larceny in Building, which 
carries a maximum 2 year sentence. The Revised Code does not 
aggravate larceny solely because it happens to occur in a 
building. Consequently, a provision allowing for a felony 
conviction based on shoplifting an item valued at $500 or 
more is required. 
XII. TD AS 11.46.230. REASONABLE DETENTION AS A DEFENSE 
This section is identical to present AS 11. 20.277. 
It provides that the owner of a store, or his employee or 
agent, can detain a person reasonably suspected of shoplifting 
for a period of time sufficient to permit the person detained 
to make or decline to make a statement, or sufficient to 
examine the store's employees and records with respect to 
the ownership of the concealed property. 
XIII. TD AS 11. 46. 240; 250. UNAUTHORIZED USE OR OCCUPANCY 
OF' PROPELLED VEHICLE 
A. Existing Law 
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Alaska currently has one "joyriding" statute for 
motor vehicles, AS 28 . 35.010, and another for boats and planes, 
AS 11 . 20.145. Both statutes pullish as a misdemeanor the 
unauthorized temporary taking of the vehicle, and are made 
lesser included offenses of larceny by AS 28.35.020 and 
11. 20.146. 
The knowing occupancy of a ' borrowed" vehicle is 
not specifically covered by existing law unless the prosecution 
can show an accessory relationship among the occupants of the 
vehicle. 
Minors, who are.the most common violators of the 
" joyriding" statutes, are prosecutable as adults except that 
the minor's guardian shall be present at all proceedings. 
B. The Code Provision 
This section covers all "propelled vehicles", a term 
defined in subsection (d). This definition eliminates the 
need for separate statutes for cars, boats and planes, and 
covers all devices "upon which or by which a person or property 
is or may be transported". It covers all the conduct pro­
scribed by existing law and uses substantially the same language 
in some subsections. 
While subsection ( 1) covers the most typical joy­
riding situations, subsections (a) (2) and (3) reach conduct 
involving excessive misuse or withholding of a vehicle by a 
person who originally obtctined possession of the vehicle legally. 
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This type of conduct is limitea to two kinds of situations. 
The first, (a) (2) , is exemplified by a garage attendant who 
without authorization uses a customer's car to go on a spree. 
The second, (a) (3), is illustrated by a person who borrows a 
car in Anchorage for an afternoon and drives it down the AlCan. 
In each case, the conduct must constitute an "unreasonable 
deviation" from the agreement or the agreed purpose of the 
bailment. 
Subsection (b) is derived from existing AS 28.35. 010 
and 11.20.145. It eliminates a possible presumption that the 
owner consented to the taking or excessive use simply because 
he had consented on a previous occasion. 
Subsection (c) retains the existing rule that joy­
riding minors are treated as adults, except that the minor's 
guardian shall be present at all proceedings. 
As under present law, a first offense under 
TD AS 11. 46.180 is a misdemeanor. Joyriding is a sufficiently 
widespread and serious problem that subsequent violations 
become C felonies under the Revised Code. 
The unauthorized occupancy statute, TD AS 11. 46.250, 
reflects the fact that joyriding is commonly undertaken by 
more than one person. This statute insures that the passengers 
who knew when they entered the car that the car was to be 
taken or used in violation of TD AS 11.46.240 will be as 
subject to criminal liability as the person who happened to 
be driving at the time of the arrest. 
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It should be emphasized that if the "joyrider" acts 
with an intent to deprive another of the vehicle, e.g. , 
abandoning the car in a remote area so that it is unlikely 
that the owner will recover the property, he has committed 
Theft pursuant to TD AS 11.46. 100. [See, definition of 
" deprive" , TD AS 11.46. 990 (3) (A) (B)] . 
XIV. TD AS 11.46.260-270 - REMOVAL OF IDENTIFICATION MARKS 
AND UNLAWFUL POSSESSION 
A. Existing Law 
Removing serial numbers, or possessing property 
with the serial numbers removed, is not in itself a crime 
under existing law. Alaska law enforcement officers have 
stressed to the Subcommission the need for a statute prohibiting 
this conduct because of the problems of proof in many receiving 
stolen property cases. 
The problem that often arises is that the State must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the_ property received 
by the defendant is the identical property previously stolen 
from some identifiable victim. Karn v. U S, 11 Alas 225, 158 
F.2d 568 (9 Cir 1946). If the receiver has removed or skill­
fully altered the serial number, the victim often finds it 
difficult to conclusively identify his property. 
B. The Code Provision 
Removal of Identification Marks, TD AS 11. 46 . 260, 
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prohibits the defacing, erasing or otherwise altering of a 
serial number or identification mark if done "with intent to 
cause interruption of the ownership of anot,her." The intent 
element prevents conviction of property owners who innocently 
alter their own property. 
The unlawful possession statute, TD AS 11. 46. 270, 
prohibits the possession of property "knowing that the 
serial number or identification mark . has been erased, 
altered, changed or removed with the intent of changing the 
identity" of the property. It may be difficult to prove 
that a professional "fence" removed the serial number himself. 
However, there will be few problems in convincing a jury that 
a person discovered to have ten television sets in his base­
ment, all with their serial numbers removed, possessed that 
property knowing it had been altered with criminal intent. 
47. 
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ARTICLE 2. BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS. 
Section 
300 Bur�lary in the First Degr:ee 
310 Burglary in the Second Degree 
320 Criminal Trespass in the First Degree 
330 Criminal Trespass in the Second Degre� 
340 Defense: Emergency Use of Premises 
350 Definition 
Sec. 11.46.300. BURGLARY IN THE FlRST DEGREE. (a) A person 
commits the crime of burglary in the first degree if he violates sec. 
310 of this chapter and the building is a dwelling or, if in effecting 
entry or while in a building or in immediate flight from the building, 
he 
(1) is armed with a deadly weapon; 
(2) causes or attempts to cause physical injury to any per-
son; or 
(3) uses or threatens to use a dangerous instrument. 
(b) Burglary in the first degree is a class B felony. 
Sec. 11.46.310. BURGLARY IN THE SECOND DEGREE. (a) /\. person 
commits the crime of burglary in the second degree if he enters or 
remains unlawfully in a-building with intent to commit a crime in the 
building. 
(b) Burglary in the second degree is a class C felony. 
Sec. 11. L�6. 320. CRIMINAL TRESPASS IN THE FIRST DEGREE. (a) A 
person commits the crime of crimin�l trespass in the first degree if he
enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling. 
(b) Criminal trespass in the first degree is a class A misdc-
meanor. 
Sec. 11. 116. 3 30. CRIMINAL TIZESPi\SS IN TIIE SECOND DEGREE. (a) A 
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pcr r,on commi ts the crime of  crimin.:11 tresp.'.ls s in the second degree if  ' 
2 he enters or remains unlawfully i.n or upon premises. 
3 (b) Criminal tresp.'.lss in the second degree is a class B misde-
4 mcanor . 
5 Sec . ll . Lf6.340 . DEFENSE : EMERGENCY USE OF PREMISES . (a) It is a 
6 
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8 
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defense to a prosecution under secs. 300 - 330 of  this chapter that 
(1) the entry , use or occupancy of  premises or use of per­
sonal property on the premises is for an emergency in the case of  
immediate and dire nee·d ; and  
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(2) as soon as reasonably practical a fter the entry , uie ,  or
occupancy , the person cont�cts the owner of the premises , the owner ' s  
agent or, if the owner is unknown , the nearest state or local pol ice 
agency , and makes a report of the time of the entry , use or occupancy 
and any damage to the premises or personal property , unless notice 
waiving necessity of the report is posted on the premises by the owner 
or the owner ' s  agent .  
.' (b) The defendant shall  have the burden of  inj ecting the issue of 
a defense under (a) of  this section . 
Sec . 11. 46. 350. DEFINITION. In secs . 300 - 340 of thi s  chapter , 
unless the context requires otherwise , "enter or remain unlawfully" 
means to enter or remain in or upon premises when the premises , at the 
time of  the entry or remaining , are not open to the public and when the 
actor is 11ot otherwise licensed or privileged to do so . A person who 
enters or remains upon unimproved and apparently unused land ,  which is 
neither fenced nor otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude 
intruders ,  does so with license and privilege unless notice against 
trespass i s  personally conu11Lmicated to him by the owner of the land or 
some other au thorized person , or unless notice is given by posting in a 
conspicuous manner. 
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ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
Chapter 46 - Offenses Against Property 
ARTICLE 2. BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS 
COMMENTARY 
The Effect of the Revised Code Provisions on the Existing 
Law of Burglary and Criminal Trespass 
In defining the crimes of burglary and criminal 
trespass, the Burglary and Criminal Trespass Article of the 
Revised Code: 
1. Eliminates the provision in existing law which
classifies a burglary occurring in the nighttime
as a more serious offense than a burglary occurring
in the daytime. Instead of retaining this common
law distinction which has little relevance in
Alaska, the Revised Code provides that a burglary
is made a more serious offense based on certain
listed factors relating to the potential for injury
to the occupants of the building.
2. Recognizes that a person may commit burglary even
though he forms his intent to commit a crime after
he enters the building. Existing law requires that
the defendant have this intent at the time he enters
the building.
3 . Eliminates the limitation in existing law that
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burglary in a building other than a dwelling does 
not occur unless the building contains property. 
4. Replaces overly specific statutes covering trespass
upon premises with the offense of criminal trespass
which is broken into two degrees depending upon
whether the trespass occurred in a dwelling or on
premises.
SECTION ANALYSIS OF REVISED CODE 
I. DEFINITIONS APPLICABLE TO BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS
ARTICLE 
Four key terms are used throughout the Burglary 
and Criminal Trespass Article - "building", "dwelling", 
"premises" and "enter or remain unlawfully.·.. The first three 
are defined in TD AS 11.06, the Gener�l Provisions Chapter. 
The fourth term is defined in TD AS 11.46.350. 
A. "Building"
"Building", in addition to its usual meaning,
includes any vehicle, watercraft, aircraft or 
structure adapted for overnight accommodation 
of persons or for carrying on business; when 
a building consists of separate units, including 
but not limited to, apartment units, offices 
or rented rooms, each unit is considered a 
separate building. 
In providing that "building" includes, in addition 
to its usual meaning, "any vehicle, watercraft, air.craft 
or structure adapted for overnight accommodation or for 
carrying on business," a definition is established which is 
broad enough to include house trailers, mobile field offices, 
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house boats, vessels and even tents used as dwellings. 
The definition's reference to "separate units" of 
a building is relevant to intrusions in hotels, apartment 
houses, offices with multiple tenants, ferries with private 
cabins, and similar structures. The result is that an intrusion 
into a single unit constitutes an entry into a building, 
which can be the basis of a burglary or criminal trespass 
prosecution. 
B. ."Dwelling". 
The term "dwelling" is defined in TD AS 11.06 as 
"a building which is usually occupied by a person therein at 
night whether or not a person is actually present." This 
formulation is a restatement of the definition of  "dwelling-
house" in the current statute, AS 11.20.130. Burglary or 
trespass in a "dwelling" is punished more severely in 
the Revised Code than other burglaries and trespass. 
C. "Premises". 
The term "premises" is defined in TD AS 11.06 
as meaning real property, including a "building." It is 
not redundant to define "premises" as including a "building" 
because the definition of "building" includes, for example, 
floating and mobile structures which are not ordinarily 
considered to be real property. By incorporating the 
term "building", the definition of "premises" covers not 
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only the ordinary concept of trespass to land, but includes 
criminal trespass into structures, which would not ordinarily 
be considered "real property. " 
D. "Enter or remain unlawfully" - TD AS 11.46. 350 
The definition of "enter or remain unlawfully" 
insures that an initial lawful entry, followed by an unlawful 
remaining, constitutes burglary if the intruder remains with 
an intent to commit a crime. If such intent is absent, the 
crime of criminal trespass has occurred. 
As applied to the burglary sections, the concept 
of committing the crime by "remain[ing] unlawfully" represents 
a departure from the common law doctrine that burglary requires 
that the defendant have a specific intent to commit a crime 
at the time he "breaks and enters." Nevertheless, existing 
AS 11. 20. 120 punishes as burglary in a dwelling house the 
act of "breaking out" of a dwelling house after having committed 
or attempted to commit a crime therein (without the necessity 
of proving that the defendant had that intent at the time he 
entered), but prescribes a maximum penalty of 3 years imprison­
ment as compared to 15 years for burglary in a dwelling and 
10 years for burglary not in a dwelling. 
The word "remain" in the phrase "enter or remain 
unlawfully" is also designed to apply to cases in which a person 
enters with "license or privilege" but remains on the premises 
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after his license or privilege has terminated. Thus, a 
person who enters a department store during regular business 
hours and hides in a public washroom until after the store 
is closed "remains unlawfully" within the meaning of this 
definition. 
The last sentence of this definition provides that 
a person who enters upon unimproved and apparently unused 
land, which is neither fenced nor otherwise enclosed in a 
manner designed to exclude intruders, does so lawfully unless 
notice against trespass is personally communicated to him by 
the owner of such land or other authorized person, or unless 
such notice is given by posting in a conspicuous manner. 
This provision is designed to expressly exclude from the scope 
of the offense of  criminal trespass, a person who enters upon 
unimproved and apparently unused land when there is no 
indication of apparent prohibition against such intrusion. 
The innocence of a typical trespass where an individual hiker 
walks without consent upon the unfenced, unpasted land of 
another, and its frequency in a state dominated by wilderness 
and public land interspersed with private land, prompts the 
conclusion that such a minimal intrusion upon the land of 
another should not be a criminal offense unless reasonable 
notice is given the trespasser not to enter or remain on such 
property. 
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II. TD AS 11.46.300; 310 - BURGLARY IN THE FIRST AND SECOND 
DEGREES 
A. Existing Law 
At common law the offense of burglary consisted of 
a breaking and entering of the dwelling house of another, 
in the nighttime, with intent to commit a felony. 
The traditional definition of burglary has been 
gradually expanded over the years to include acts which would 
not have been burglary in the common law sense. 
Existing law recognizes the offenses of Burglary 
in a Dwelling H'ouse, AS 11. 20. 0 80, Burglary Not in a Dwelling 
House, AS 11.20. 100, and Burglary in Leaving a Dwelling House, 
AS 11.20.120. 
Currently, daytime burglary in an unoccupied dwell­
ing is punishable by a 1 - 10 year sentence. If the burglary 
is committed at nighttime, it carries a 1 - 15 year sentence. 
If another person is within the dwelling during a daytime or 
nighttime burglary, the statute provides for a 1 - 20 year 
sentence. 
Burglary not in a dwelling house, on the other hand, 
does not distinguish between daytime and nighttime burglaries. 
While the legislature apparently considered such burglaries to 
be less serious than burglaries in dwellings by providing for 
maximum sentence of only 5 years, it somewhat inconsistently 
provided for a minimum sentence of 2 years instead of the 
1 year minimum for burglary in a dwelling. 
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The crime of burglary in a dwelling house requires 
that the defendant enter with a specific "intent to commit a 
crime," while the burglary not in a dwelling statute requires 
an entry with an intent to "steal" or commit "a felony." 
"Breaking out" of a dwelling house of another, 
after having committed or attempted to commit a crime therein, 
is now punishable under AS 11. 20. 120 by a maximum penalty of 
3 years imprisonment. 
B. The Code Provision 
Both existing law and the burglary statutes of the 
Revised Code list aggravating factors which, when present, subject 
the defendant to more severe punishment than he would receive 
for a non-aggravated burglary. The Revised Code retains some of 
tne existing factors, such as whether the building is a dwelling, 
but rejects others, such as the nighttime-daytime distinction. 
Unlike existing law, the Revised Code treats daytime 
and nighttime burglaries alike - a change motivated in large 
part by the increasing occurrence of daylight burglaries 
occurring while Alaska residents are at work, especially during 
the summer months. It is interesting to note that this dis-
tinctior, was derived directly from Oregon law when Congress 
adopted a major portion of the Oregon Criminal Code as the 
Criminal Code for Alaska in 1899. Rather than distinguishing 
between daytime and nighttime burglaries, this concept as 
applied in Alaska has the effect of aggravating most burglaries 
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which happen to occur during the winter months. This distinction 
has been rejected in virtually all revised codes, and is partic­
ularly inappropriate in Alaska. 
The basic definition of burglary appears in 
TD AS 11.46.310, Burglary in the Second Degree. It requires 
that the defendant "enter or remain unlawfully, " a term defined 
in TD AS 11.46. 350 and discussed in§ I D, supra. The term 
does not require a "breaking" and is consistent with existing 
AS 11.20.080 and 110, which recognize that an "unlawful entry " 
is a "breaking and entering" for purposes of the burglary in 
a dwelling statute. 
As discussed in§ III B, infra, the crime of criminal 
trespass in the Revised Code requires that the defendant enter 
or remain unlawfully in or upon premises. Consequently, 
burglary amounts to criminal trespass with two aggravating 
factors: (1) the premise invaded is a "building", and (2) 
the intruder enters or remains with intent to commit a crime. 
The Revised Code eliminates the necessity of proving 
intent to "steal" or to commit a "felony" in a nondwelling 
burglary, which is presently required by AS 11.20. 100. This 
change makes the intent element for burglary the same as that 
now required for burglary in a dwelling by AS 11.20.080 --
an intent to commit any crime. The Revised Code also does 
away with the existing requirement that burglary not in a 
dwelling does not occur unless property is actually kept in 
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the building. Finally, as discussed in§ I D, supra, the 
Revised Code also eliminates the present requirement that the 
intruder had the intent to commit the crime at the time of the 
entering. 
Burglary in the second degree is committed under the 
Revised Code when a person enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building with intent to commit a crime therein. If the building 
happens to be a dwelling, the offense is of a more serious nature 
because of the potential for harm to the occupant, and the 
intruder is accordingly guilty of burglary in the first degree. 
Further, if the intruder, in effecting entry or while in the 
building or in immediate flight from any building is armed with 
a deadly weapon, or causes or attempts to cause physical injury 
to any person, or uses or threatens to use a dangerous instrument, 
he is likewise guilty of burglary in the first degree. Thus, 
the degree structure in the Revised Code emphasizes the 
potential for injury to the occupant of a dwelling or building 
as the distinction between first and second degree burglary. 
III. TD AS 11.46. 320; 330 - CRIMINAL TRESPASS IN THE FIRST 
AND SECOND DEGREES 
A. Existing Law 
At least four statutes in the existing criminal 
code prohibit trespass or unlawful entry: AS 11.20. 630, 
Trespass (on land or premises); AS 11. 20.610, Trespass on 
Improved Lands (wilful entering of garden, orchard, or 
other improved land ''with intent to cut, take, carry away, 
destroy, or injure the trees, grain, grass, hay, fruit, or 
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vegetable products . . .  "); AS 11. 20. 650, Trespass on Mining 
Claims ("trespass upon a mining claim, with intent to commit 
a felony"); and AS 11. 20. 135, Unauthorized Entry, Use or 
Occupancy of Property (entry into "dwelling, house, tent, 
hotel, office, store, shop, warehouse, barn, factory or other 
building, boat, ship, motor vehicle, railroad car or structure; 
or apartment, cottage, bathhouse, hunting or fishing lodge, 
garage or any structure"). 
B. The Code Provision 
The Revised Code replaces this needless proliferation 
of statutes with two degrees of trespass, one involving 
trespass in or upon premises, the other involving trespass 
in a dwelling. The primary aim of the trespass statutes is 
the protection of one's property from unauthorized intrusion 
by others. 
Trespass in the Second Degree, TD AS 11. 46. 330, 
is committed in or upon "premises" as that term is defined 
in TD AS 11.06 and discussed at§ I C, supra. If the 
invaded premises is a dwelling, the crime is Criminal Trespass 
in the first Degree, TD AS 11. 46. 320. The heavier penalty is 
justified by the alarm caused to inhabitants by the entry, 
and the resulting increased likelihood of violent harm to 
inhabitants and intruders alike. 
The element of "entering or remaining unlawfully" 
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(defined in TD AS 11. 46. 350 and discussed at§ I D) required 
for burglary is also required for both degrees of criminal 
trespass. The state must prove that "at the time of the 
entry or remaining, the premises [were] not open to the public 
and the defendant [was] not otherwise licensed or privileged 
to do so. " 
IV. TD AS 11. 46. 340 - EMERGENCY USE OF PREMISES 
A. Existing Law 
Existing AS 11.20. 135 provides for the misdemeanor 
offense of "unauthorized entry, use or occupancy of premises." 
This specific statute is necessary under existing law as 
the trespass statute, AS 11.20. 630, requires that the 
defendant remain on property after notice is given that he is 
trespassing for the crime to have been committed. AS 11.20.135 
does not require such notice for the crime of unauthorized entry 
to occur. 
B. The Code Provision 
The Revised Code adequately covers unauthorized 
entry in the criminal trespass statutes, TD AS 11. 46.320, 330. 
However, the provision of the existing statute which provides 
that emergency use of premises is a defense to a charge of 
unauthorized entry is covered in the Code in TD AS 11.46. 340. 
Existing law requires that the person who used the 
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premises in an emergency situation notify the owner or the police 
of such entry within 15 days after using the fctcility. However, 
this requirement ignores the practicalities of providing such 
timely notice in a remote bush area as well as providing too 
much leeway in the event of a trespass near a population center. 
In place of the rigid 1 5  day requirement, the Code requires 
that notice be given ''as soon as reasonably practical after the 
entry . " 
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ARTICLE 3. ARSON, CRIMINAL MISCHIEF AND RELATED OFFENSES. 
Section 
400 Arson in the First Degree 
410 Arson in the Second Degree 
420 Reckless Burning 
430 Criminally Negligent Burning 
450 Failure to Report a Dangerous Fire 
480 Criminal Mischief fRESERVED] 
490 Definitions 
Sec. 11.46.400. ARSON IN THE FIRST DEGREE. (a) A person commits 
the crime of arson in the first degree if, by starting a fire or causing 
an explosion, he intentionally damages 
(1) protected· property of another; or 
( 2) any property, whether his own or another's, and the act 
recklessly places another person in danger of physical injury or pro­
tected property of another in danger of damage. 
(b) Arson in the first degree is a class A felony. 
Sec. 11.46.410. ARSON IN THE SECOND DEGREE. (a) A person commits 
the crime of arson in the second degree if, by starting a fire or 
causing an explosion, he intentionally damages a building of another 
that is not protected property . .  
(b) Arson in the second degree is a class B felony. 
Sec. 11. 46. 4 20. RECKLESS BURNING. (a) A person commits the crime 
of reckless burning if he recklessly damages property of another by 
fire or explosion. 
(b) Reckless burning is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 1 1.46.430. CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT BURNING. 
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the crime of criminally negligent burning when with criminal negligence 
he damages property of another by fire or explosion. 
(b) Criminally negligent burning is a class B misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.46.450. FAILURE TO CONTROL OR REPORT A DANGEROUS FIRE. 
(a) A person commits the crime of failure to· control or report a danger­
ous fire if he knows that a fire is endangering life or a substantial 
amount of property of another and fails to take reasonable measures to 
put out or control the fire, when he can do so without substantial risk 
to himself, or to give a prompt fire alarm if 
(1) he knows that he is under an official, contractual or 
other legal duty to prevent or combat the fire; or · (2) the fire was started, although lawfully, by him or with 
his assent, or on property in his custody or control. 
(b) Failure to control or report a dangerous fire is a class A 
.misdemeanor. 
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF. [RESERVED] Sec. 11. 46. 480. 
Sec. 11.46. 490. DEFINITIONS. In secs. 400 - 480 of this chapter, 
unless the context requires otherwise, 
(1) " protected property" means a structure, place or thing 
customarily occupied by people, including but not limited to buildings 
in which persons congregate for civic, political, educational, religious, 
social or recreational purposes and all land on which grass, brush, 
timber and other natural vegetative material grows; ( 2) "property of another" means property in which anyone 
other than the actor has a possessory or proprietary interest including 
property belonging wholly or in part to the actor's spouse; if a 
building or structure is divided into separately occupied units, any 
unit not occupied by the· actor is the property of another. 
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ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 46. Offenses Against Property 
ARTICLE 3. ARSON, CRIMINAL MISCHIEF AND RELATED OFFENSES 
COMMENTARY 
The Effect of the Revised Code Provision on the Existing 
Law of Arson and Related Offenses 
1. Provides a single location for arson and related 
offenses. In existing law these offenses are 
sc�ttered both within and outside the Criminal 
Code. 
2. Recognizes that the most serious form of arson 
involves damage to "protected property" of another 
or conduct which creates a risk of physical 
injury to any person. For example, arson of a 
crowded restaurant is treated as the most serious 
form of arson as opposed to its present classi­
fication as second degree arson. 
3. Specifically provides that arson can occur by 
means of fire or explosion. Existing law covers 
arson only by means of fire. 
4. Classifies forest lands as protected property 
for purposes of the first degree arson statute, 
thus providing increased protection to one of 
Alaska's most valuable but fragile resources. 
5. Specifically provides that a person who starts 
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fire on his own land commits a criminal offense 
if he fails to take reasonable measures to 
control the fire. 
SECTION ANALYSIS OF REVISED CODE 
I. Haphazard Treatment of Arson-Related Offenses in 
Existing Law 
One of the major defects with the existing Criminal 
Code is that it is extremely difficult to use. Because 
there has never been a comprehensive revision of the Criminal 
Code since Congress imposed most of Oregon's statutes on 
Alaska in 1899, there is little organization by subject 
matter in the existing statutes. Further, though new 
statutes have been added over the years, they can not always 
be found where one would expect them to be. This unfortunate 
situation is especially apparent in the area of arson 
and related offenses. 
A person reading Title 11 for the first time 
would reasonably expect to find all arson-related offenses 
contained in the article entitled "Arson and Related Crimes". 
Indeed, four degrees of Arson, AS 11. 20.010, 020, 030 and 
050, and a statute covering Burning to Defraud an Insurer, 
AS 11. 20. 070 are found here. However, the provision covering 
Negligent Use of Combustible Materials, AS 11. 15. 340, is 
contained in the Offenses Against the Person chapter and 
not in the "Arson and Related Crimes" article. Further, 
while most arson-related offenses are contained in Title 11, 
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others appear completely outside the Criminal Code. For 
example, the Public Resources Title contains AS 41. 15. 150, 
which prohibits a person from "maliciously or wantonly 
set[ting] on fire timber, brush, grass or other inflammable 
material located or growing on lands that are not owned, 
possessed, or controlled by him". Violation of this statute 
carries a maximum 10-year sentence. Smith v. State, 531 
P.2d 1273 (AK 1975). Other relevant statutes appearing 
outside existing Title 11 include AS 41.15.070, Disposal 
of Burning Materials; AS 41. 15.690, Building a Fire Without 
Clearing Ground or Leaving Unextinguished Fire; and AS 41.15.110, 
Allowing Fire to Escape or Failure to Make Effort to Extinguish. 
A. Analysis of Arson Provisions in Existing Title 11 
Four degrees of arson are recognized in existing 
law with penalties ranging from 2 to 20 years for first 
degree arson to 1 to 2 years for fourth degree arson. To 
commit any degree of arson, the defendant must act "wilfully 
and maliciously", a term which emphasizes that the act 
sufficient to sustain a conviction for arson must be "criminal" 
and not just a result of "carelessness''. State v. Paquin, 368 
P.2d 85 (Or. 1962). While at common law arson was defined 
as the "malicious burning of a dwelling house of another", 
the four degrees of arson in existing Alaska law have signi­
ficantly expanded this concept. 
Under existing law a "burning" of the building 
is an essential element of the crime of arson, State v. Elwell, 
209 p. 616 (Or. 1922). To constitute a burning there must 
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be an ignition of some part of the building resulting in a 
perceptible change in its composition, at common law called 
"charring". It is not necessary that the buildings should be 
consumed or even materially injured. This rule is retained in 
the Revised Code by providing that arson occurs whenever property 
is damaged. 
The properties designated by AS 11.20. 010 as the 
subjects of first degree arson are: (1) "a dwelling house, 
whether occupied, unoccupied or vacant, or (2) a kitchen, 
shop, barn, stable or other outhouse that is part of a 
dwelling, or belongs to or adjoins a dwelling, whether [the 
arsonist's] property or the property of another . . . .  " By 
including as a subject of arson the defendant's own property, 
the existing statute departs from the common law rule that 
the property burned had to be the property "of another". 
Second Degree Arson, AS 11.20.020, prohibits the 
burning of "a building or structure of any kind" except 
those listed in first degree arson. Thus under existing law, 
the arson of an unoccupied outhouse is first degree arson, 
while arson of a crowded restaurant is only arson in the 
second degree. 
AS 11.20. 030 defines third degree arson. This 
statute contains some of the elements necessary for first 
and second degree arson; e.g., it punishes any person who 
"wilfully and maliciously" burns property, as well as any 
person who, with the same criminal intent, "aids, counsels 
or procures" the burning of property. However, th.ird degree 
arson only occurs when "personal " property is burned. The 
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statute further requires that the property belong to some­
one other than the defendant. 
AS 11.20. 050 classifies as fourth degree arson 
an attempt to commit arson in the first, second or third 
degree, utilizing the definition of "attempted arson" 
appearing in AS 11. 20. 060. 
AS 11. 20.070 describes the offense of burning 
property with the intent to defraud an insurer. 
Finally, AS 11.15.340 provides that a person .. . 
"who negligently or recklessly causes a fire which results 
in physical harm to another person or damage to the property 
of another ... " has committed the offense of "Negligent Use 
of Combustible Materials". 
B. The Code Provisions 
The primary rationale of the revised arson article is the 
protection of human life and safety. The secondary rationale 
is the protection of property. The Revised Code provides 
for two degrees of arson, graded according to whether or 
not "protected property" is involved or whether or not 
there is danger to human life. 
The Revised Code also includes the less serious 
crimes of reckless burning and criminally negligent burning, 
which require only that the defendant act with a "reckless" 
or "criminally negligent" culpable mental state as opposed to 
the "intentional" culpable mental state required for first 
and second degree arson. 
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While existing law provides that arson may be 
accomplished only by starting a fire, the Revised Code 
follows the lead of recent revisions to enlarge the crime 
of arson to expressly include damage by explosion as well 
as by fire. 
Unlike existing law, the Revised Code treats an 
attempt to burn property, as it does an attempt to commit any 
other crime. See, Article 31, Attempt and Related Offenses. 
Also unlike existing law, the Revised Code does not contain 
a specific statute covering the destruction of property with 
the intent to defraud an insurer. Such activity usually 
amounts to either attempted or actual theft by deception 
from the insurance company if the damaged property belonged 
solely to the arsonist. However, if anyone other than the 
arsonist has a possessory or proprietary interest in the 
property, the conduct is punishable as second degree arson. 
Regardless of who owns the property, a burning to defraud .an 
insurer amounts to first degree arson if another person is 
recklessly placed in danger of physical injury or if protected 
property of another is endangered. 
Finally, the Revised Code will treat as criminal mis­
chief both the intentional damaging of property of another 
by means other than fire or explosion, and the damaging by fire or 
explosion of property that is not a building or protected 
property, e.g., personal property, unless the conduct endangers 
another's life or protected property. TD AS ll. 46. 400 (a) (2). 
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II. TD AS 11. 46.400, 410 - ARSON IN THE FIRST AND SECOND 
DEGREES 
TD AS 11.46. 410, Arson in the Second Degree, 
prohibits the intentional damaging of a building of another 
that is not protected property by fire or explosion. Building 
is defined in Chapter 06 and discussed in this Tentative 
Draft at§ I A of Article 2, Burglary and Criminal Trespass. 
Because of the specific exclusion of protected 
property from the offense of arson in the second degree, 
the type of buildings covered by this section would be those 
that are not "customarily occupied" by people. Since this 
degree of arson would not ordinarily threaten human life 
or safety it is treated less severely than first degree arson, 
but nonetheless carries the lieavy penalty of a Class B 
felony. For example, if Smith intentionally sets fire to 
Jones' storage shed he has committed arson in the second 
degree. However, if the shed were in close proximity to 
Jones' house, Smith could be guilty of first degree arson. 
TD AS 11. 4 6. 4 0 0 (a) ( 2) . 
The Revised Code raises arson to first degree when 
the property involved is "protected property". "Protected 
property" is defined in TD AS 11. 46. 490 (1) to include any 
" . . .  structure, place or thing customarily occupied by 
people . . .  ", regardless of whether it happened to be occupied 
at the time of the burning. 
The commentary from the Oregon Revised Code provides 
the following guideline to be used in interpreting the phrase 
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"customarily occupied by pPuple" as it is used within the 
definition of "protected property" in TD AS 11.46.490. 
In instructing jurors, in ruling on motions 
for judgment of acquittal, or wherever a determination 
must be made as to whether a certain structure, place 
or thing is "customarily occupied by people," we expect 
the following meanings to be used: for purposes of 
[TD AS 11.46. 020] a building, structure or thing is 
customarily occupied by people if: 
(a) by reason of circumstances of time and place 
when the fire or explosion occurs, people are 
normally in the building, structure or thing, or 
(b) circumstances are such as to make the fact 
of occupancy by persons a reasonable possibility. 
Because it will normally be a jury question whether 
the state has proved that the building, structure or 
thing is "customarily occupied," the jury will be 
appropriately instructed that if they find it is 
customarily occupied the crime would be first �egree 
arson; if they tind it is not customarily occuµled, 
the er ime would be sec(>nd d, 'gree arson. 
ORS§ 104.320, Commentary, at p.184. 
The definition of protected property, in addition 
to dwellings, also specifically includes "buildings in which 
persons congregate for civic, political, education, religious 
or recreational purposes" to insure that the destruction of 
what is commonly thought of as "public buildings" is treated 
as the most serious form of arson. 
Protected property also includes "land on which 
grass, brush, timber, and other natural vegetative material 
grows" which is the definition of "forested lands" appearing 
in AS 11. 15  . l 7 0 . Because forest fires in Alaska ordinarily 
create both a high degree of risk to human safety and 
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substantial economic loss to the state, the intentional 
starting of such a fire is punished as first degree arson. 
By specifically including within the definition 
of protected property, "property belonging wholly or in part 
to the actor's spouse," the Revised Code, consistent with 
existing AS 11.20. 040, recognizes that arson occurs even 
though the property damaged belongs to the actor' s spouse. 
The Revised Code also classifies as first degree 
arson the intentional damaging of any property by fire or 
explosion when such act "recklessly places another person 
in danger of physical injury or protected property of another 
in danger of damage." TD AS ll.46. 400 (a) (2). This section 
requires that the arsonist act with the ''intent" to destroy 
any property, but requires only that he act "recklessly" -
consciously disregard a known, substantial and unjustifiable 
risk of harm - toward a person or "protected property of 
another". 
III. TD AS 11. 46.420, 430 - RECKLESS BURNING; CRIMINALLY 
NEGLIGENT USE OF COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS 
Existing AS 11. 15.340, entitled Negligent Use of 
Combustible Materials, covers the person who "negligently 
or recklessly causes a fire which results in physical harm 
to another person or in damage to the property of another .. . . " 
The offense is classified as a misdemeanor with a maximum 
penalty of one year's imprisonment. 
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Consistent with its approach in classifying offenses 
according to levels of blameworthiness, the Revised Code 
recognizes the offenses of reckless burning as well as 
criminally negligent burning. As noted at p. 17 of Tentative 
Draft, Part 1, the reckless offender is more culpable than the 
criminally negligent defendant because he consciously 
disregards a known risk, while the criminally negligent 
offender is not aware of the risk and, hence, disregards 
it unconsciously. In the Revised Code, reckless burning 
is classified as a Class A misdemeanor while negligent 
burning is a Class B misdemeanor. 
If the defendant does not "intend" to damage 
property but he is reckless, that is, he "consciously disre­
gards a substantial and unjustifiable risk", resulting in 
damage to the property of another, he has committed the crime 
of Reckless Burning, TD AS 1 1. 46. 420. On the other hand, 
if the actor is merely criminally negligent, that is, he 
"fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk" 
(See, Tentative Draft, Part 2, at p. 17 for commentary 
on definitions of "reckless" and "criminally negligent") 
resulting in damage to property of another, he has committed 
the crime of Criminally Negligent Burning, TD AS 11.46. 430. 
While existing AS 11. 15. 340 also covers conduct 
which negligently or recklessly causes "physical harm" to 
another person by fire, such conduct is more than adequately 
covered in the assault article of the Revised Code (See, 
Tentative Draft, Part 1, at p. 36), and so is not covered 
in the arson article. 
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IV. TD AS 11.46.450 - FAILURE TO CONTROL OR REPORT A 
DANGEROUS FIRE 
Existing AS 41.15.ll0(a) creates an affirmative 
duty on a person to exercise due care to prevent the uncon­
trolled spread of a fire when he knows of a fire or sets a 
fire on forest lands owned, possessed or controlled by him. 
TD AS 11.46.450 broadens existing law by providing 
that the failure to control or report a dangerous fire is 
in some circumstances a criminal offense, regardless of 
whether it occurs on forest lands. The crime may be committed 
by people in either of two categories. 
Subsection (a) (1) recognizes that a person 
II under an official, contractual or other legal duty 
to prevent or combat the fire" commits the crime if, knowing 
that the fire is dangerous, he either fails to take reason­
able measures to control the fire or fails to give a prompt 
fire alarm. 
Subsection (a) (2) places the same duty on any 
person, not just one who is under a duty to act, when the 
fire was started by him or with his assent, or if the fire 
was started on property in his custody. 
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LA-L 1.0 
ARTICLE�- FORGERY AND RELATED OFFENSES. 
Scctioh 
500 Forgery 
510 Criminal Possession of a ForBe<l Instrument 
520 Criminal Possession of a Forgery Device 
530 Criminal Simulation 
540 Obtaining Signature by Deception 
550 Offering a False Instrument for Recording 
560 Defraudi_ng a Coin Machine [RESERVED] 
570 Criminal Impersonation 
580 Definitions 
Sec. 11. 46. 500. FORGERY. (a) A person commits the crime of 
forgery if with intent to defraud he 
or 
(1) falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument; 
(2) utters a written instrument which he knows to be forged. 
(b) Forgery is a class C felony. 
Sec. 11. L•6. 510. CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A FORGED INSTRUMENT. (a) 
A person commits the crime of criminal possession of a forged instru­
ment if, knowing it to be forged and with intent to utter it, he 
possesses a forged instrument. 
(b) Criminal possession of a forged instrument is a class C 
felony. 
Sec. 11.46.520. CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A FORGERY DEVICE. (a) A 
person commits the crime of criminal possession of a forgery device if 
(1) he rn.:ikes or possesses with knowlec.lee of its character 
any plate, die or other device, apparatus, equipment or article specifi­
cally desicne<l for use in counterfeiting or otherwise forging written 
instruments; or 
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(2) with intent to use, or to aid or permit another to use, ' 
the device for purposes of forccry, he mnkes or possesses any device, 
apparatus, equipment or article capable of or adaptable to such use. 
(b) Criminal possession of a forgery device is a class C felony. 
Sec. 11.46.530. CRIMINAL SIMULATION. (a) A person commits the 
crime of criminal simulation if 
(1) with intent to defraud, he makes or alters any object 
in such a manner that it appears to have an antiquity, rarity, source 
or authorship that it does not in fact possess; or 
(2) with knowledge of its true character and with intent to 
defraud, he utters or possesses an object so simulated. 
(b) Criminal simulation is 
(1) a class C felony if the value of what the object pur-
ports to represent is $500 or more; 
(2) a class A �is<lemeanor if the value of what the object 
purports to represent is $50 or more but less than $500; 
(3) a class B misdemeanor if the value of what the object 
purports to represent is less than $50. 
Sec. 11.46.540. OBTAINING A SIGNATURE BY DECEPTION. (a) A person 
commits the crime of obtaining a signature by deception if with intent 
to defraud he causes another to sign or execute a written instrument 
by deception. 
(b) Obtaining a signature by deception is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.46.550. OFFERING A FALSE INSTRUMENT FOR RECORDING. (a) 
/\ person commits the crime of offcrinf; a false instrument for recordinf; 
J.f, knowing that a written instrument relating to or affecting real or 
pursonal property or directly affecting n contractual relationship con­
Lains a false statement or false information, and with intent to defraud, 
he presents or afters it to a public office or a public servant with the 
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knowledge or belief that it will be registered, filed or recorded or be­
come a part of the records of that public office or public servant. 
(b} Offering a false instrument for recording is a class A m�sdemean 
Sec. 11.46.560. DEFRAUDING A COIN MACHINE. [RESERVED] 
Sec. 11. 46.570. CRIMINAL IMPERSONATION. (a) A person commits the 
crime of criminal impersonation if he 
(1) assumes a false identity and docs an act in his assumed 
character with intent to defraud; or 
(2) pretends to be a representative of some person or organi� 
zation and does an act in his pretended capacity with intent to 
defraud. 
(b) Criminal impersonation is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.46.580. DEFINITIONS. (a) In secs. 500 - 570 of this 
chapter, unless the context otherwise requires 
(1) to "falsely make" a written instrument means to make or 
draw a complete written instrument in its entirety, or an incomplete 
written instrument which purports to be an authentic creation of its 
ostensible maker, but which is not, either because the ostensible maker 
i.s fictitious or because, if real, he did not authorize the making or 
drawing of the instrument; 
(2) to "falsely complete" a written instrument means to 
transform, by adding, inserting or changing matter, an incomplete writt 
instrument into a complete one ,,.ri.thout the authority of anyone entitled 
to grant it, so that the complete written instrument falsely appears 
or purports to be in all re�pccts an authentic creation of its ostcnsib e 
maker or authorized by him; 
(3) to "falsely .:ilter" a written instrument means to ch,:::mge, 
wLL:hout authorization by anyone entitled to r,rant it, a written instru­
ment, \vhcther complete or incomplete, by means of erasure, obliteration, 
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deletion, insertion of new matter, transposition of matter or in any 
other rn.:1nncr, so that: the instJ�umcnt so al tercel falsely appears or 
purports to be in all respects an authentic creation of its ostensible 
maker or authorized by him. 
(b) In secs . 500 - 570 of this chapter 
(1) "complete written instrument" means one which purports 
to be a genuine written instrument fully drawn with respect to every 
essential feature; 
(2) "foro-ed instrument" means a written instrument which has D 
been falsely made, completed or altered; 
(3) "incomplete written instrument" means one which contains 
some matter by way of content or authentication but which requires 
additional matter in order to render it a complete written instrument; 
(4) "intent to defraud" means 
(A) .an intent to use deception or to injure someone's 
interest which has value; or 
(B) knowledge that the defendant is facilitating a fraud 
or injury to be perpetrated or inflicted by someone else. 
(5) "utter" means to is sue, deli vcr, publish, circulate, 
disseminate, transfer or tender a written instrument or other object 
to another; 
( 6) "·written ins trumcn t" means any paper, document, ins tru-
mcr1t, electronic recording or article containing written or printed 
matter or the equivalent, whether complete or incomplete, used for the 
purpose of reciting, embodying, conveying or recording information or 
constituting a symbol or evidence of value, right, privilege or identifi­
cation, which is capable of being used to the advantage or disadvantage 
of some person. 
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ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 46. Offenses Against Property 
ARTICLE 4. FORGERY AND RELATED OFFENSES 
COMMENTARY 
The Effect of the Revised Code Provisions on the Existing 
Law of Forgery and Related Offenses 
1. Combines the numerous existing forgery provisions 
into one statute. This consolidation eliminates 
the unnecessary and confusing distinctions among 
the types of instrument that may be forged, the 
means by which forgery is accomplished, and the state 
of mind with which the prohibited acts are performed. 
2. Expands the present law prohibiting the simulation 
and attempted sale of fake gold, ivory and jade to 
include the simulation of other articles such as 
antiques, works of art, and rare manuscripts. 
3. Expands the present law prohibiting the obtaining 
of property by fraudulently obtaining a signature 
to include the attempted or actual obtaining of 
any benefit by deceptively obtaining a signature. 
4. Specifically prohibits using an object such as a 
slug in a coin machine, which may not be covered 
by existing law. 
5. Combines the various existing criminal impersona­
tion statutes into a single section. 
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SECTION ANALYSIS OF REVISED CODE 
INTRODUCTION 
The forgery article prohibits conduct which is 
essentially preparatory to Theft, TD AS 11.46.100. As the 
draftsman of the Model Penal Code noted, a revision of the 
criminal law which deals effectively with theft, attempt 
and complicity diminishes the need for a separate offense of 
forgery. However, as in the case of the M.P.�., 
[w]e retain forgery as a distinct offense partly 
because the concept is so embedded in statute and 
popular understanding that it would be inconvenient 
and unlikely that any legislature would completely 
abandon it, and partly in recognition of the special 
effectiveness of forgery as a means of undermining 
public confidence in important symbols of commerce, 
and of perpetrating large scale frauds. 
M.P.C., Tentative Draft No. 11, Commentary at 80 (1960) . 
Under both existing law and the Revised Code, 
most forgery-related offenses are classified as felonies, 
reflecting the determination that they are serious crimes. 
That determination is based on the strong community interest 
in being able to rely on written instruments to be what they 
appear to be. Any modern economy runs on symbols of value -
paper money, checks, bills of lading, deeds, credit cards, 
etc. - instead of tangible wealth. Forging such symbols 
should be strongly discouraged. 
I. TD AS 11.46.500 - FORGERY 
A. Existing Law 
Currently, creating and passing forged articles 
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are covered by some sixteen statutes, which provide for 
various penalties depending on (1) what type of instrument 
is forged, (2) by what means the forging or passing was 
accomplished, and (3) with what culpable mental state the 
defendant acted when he forged or passed the instrument. 
1. What Can Be Forged? 
Punishable by a maximum of 20 years, with minimum 
sentences varying between 1 and 2 years, are forgeries of 
a "bank bill, promissory note, draft, check or other evidence 
of debt issued by a person or by [a government], " AS 11.25.020; 
"bank notes or other genuine instruments, " AS 11.25.060; 
"�n instrument or writing purporting to be a note, draft or 
other evidence of debt issued by [a] corporation, " AS 11.25.090; 
and the following items listed in AS 11.25.010: 
a public record, certificate, return, or 
attestation of a clerk, notary public, or other 
public officer in relation to a matter in which 
the certificate, return or attestation may be 
r�ceived as legal evidence, or a note, certificate, 
or other evidence of debt issued by an officer 
of the state, or borough, town or other municipal 
or public corporation, authorized to issue it, or a 
contract, charter, letters, patent, deed, lease, 
bill of sale, will, testament, bond, writing oblig­
atory, undertaking, letter of attorney, policy 
of insurance, bill of lading, bill of exchange, 
promissory note, evidence of debt, or any acceptance 
of a bill of exchange, endorsement or assignment 
of a promissory note, or a warrant, order, check, 
money, other property, a receipt for money or other 
property, an acquittance or discharge for money 
or other property, or a plat, draft, or survey 
of land ... 
Subsequent violations of any of these statutes carry a minimum 
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sentence which is the maximum sentence authorized under the 
particular statute, which in some cases amounts to 20 years. 
AS 11.25.110. 
Punishable by a 1-10 year sentence is the forgery 
or counterfeiting of a "gold, silver or other coin which 
is current by law or usage in �he State". AS 11.25.040. A 
subsequent conviction carries a minimum 10 year sentence. 
AS 11. 25.110. 
Punishable by 1-5 years is the altering or 
defacing of "an artificial earmark, button or brand upon 
a horse, mare, gelding, foal, mule, ass, jenny, bull, cow, 
steer, calf, sheep, swine, goat, reindeer or fox, " AS 11.20.180; 
and the forgery of any of the following items listed in 
AS 11.25.0 70: 
a receipt or other written evidence of the delivery 
into a warehouse, commission house, forwarding 
house, mill, store, or other building occupied 
by him or his employer, of any grain, flour, pork, 
beef, wool, or other goods, wares, or merchandise 
which have not been received or delivered previous 
to the making and uttering of the receipt or other 
written evidence of delivery .... 
Punishable by imprisonment of 3 months - 1 year 
are forgeries of ' books, papers, writings, or securities 
belonging to or in the possession of [a) corporation or company." 
AS 11.20.430; and any "written or printed statement or 
account relating to the liabilities, assets or property 
of la] corporation or company. " AS 11. 20. 440. A sentenc� 
of 1-6 months is provided for the forgery of "the private 
brand, label, stamp or trademark of another. " AS 11.25. 080. 
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2. By What Means Can Forgery be Accomplished? 
The second way in which existing law distinguishes 
among forgeries is the means by which the making or passing 
of the forged instrument is accomplished. 
Punishable by maximum twenty year term, with a 
minimum of 1 or 2 years, are forgeries accomplished by affixing 
a fictitious signature, AS 11.25. 090, and by connecting 
"different parts of bank notes or other genuine instruments," 
AS 11.25. 060. While AS 11. 25.010 provides that forgery of a 
public record can be accomplished by "rnak[ing), alter[ing] , 
forg[ing], counterfeit ling), print[ing] or photograph[ing]", 
forgery of evidence of a debt can only be accomplished by 
"makling), alter[ingl, forg[ing] or counterfeit[ing] ". 
AS 11.25.020. Punished in the same manner are the use of for­
geries "by utter[ing] or pass [ing] as true," AS 11.25.010; and 
"utter [ing), publish[ingl, pass[inq] or tender[ing] in payment," 
AS 11. 25.020. Punishable by a l  - 5 year term is a forgery 
accomplished by "making or altering ". AS 11.25. 070. 
The remaining means by which forgery can be accompli­
shed are punished by 3 month - 1 year terms of imprisonment: 
"destroy[ing), alter[ing] , mutilat[ing] or in any manner 
falsify[ing] or concur[ring] therein", AS 11.20. 430; and 
"mak[ing] , circulat[ing], publish[ingl or concur[ring] therein" , 
AS 11. 20. 440. 
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3. With What Culpable Mental State Did the 
Defendant Act? 
The distinctions among types of forged instruments and 
the methods by which they can be forged discussed above, while 
probably unnecessary and inconsistent, are at least not difficult to 
understand. The final way in which existing law distinguishes 
among the various forgery crimes, however, is confusing to 
anyone who tries to read meaning into differences in language, 
as judges and lawyers are prone to do. 
The existing statuti?s provide for at. least seven 
different states of mind, or "intent", with which an article 
can be forged or passed. AS 11.25.070 requires that the 
defendant act "wilfully or knowingly". Other statutes include 
a " wilfully and knowingly" requirement but require additionally 
that the defendant act "with intent to deceive", AS 11.25.080; 
"with intent to defraud or deceive", AS 11.20.430-440; or 
"with intent to convert [the altered property] to his own 
use'', AS 11. 20.180. Other statutes require an act " with 
intent to injure or defraud", AS 1 1.25.010; or "with intent 
to injure or defraud another" , AS 11.25.020. More specifically, 
still other statutes require that a forgery be made or possessed 
" with intent to utter or pass ... as true or genuine." 
AS 11.25.020, 060, 090. 
B. The Code Provision 
All of the conduct prohibited by the dozen or 
more specific existing statutes on forgery is also prohibited 
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by Article 4 of the Revised Code, Forgery and Related 
Offenses. 
The single most comprehensive simplification 
was accomplished in the basic Forgery statute, TD AS 11.46.500. 
The Revised Code does not make liability depend on what 
type of article is forged or passed, but simply punishes 
the forging or uttering of a " written instrument." 
"Written instrument" is defined broadly in 
TD AS ll.46.580 (b) (6) as 
any paper, document, instrument, electronic recording 
or article containing written or printed matter or 
the equivalent, whether complete or incomplete, used 
for the purpose of reciting, embodying, conveying 
or recording information or constituting a symbol or 
evidence of value, right, privilege or identification, 
which is capable of being used to the advantage or 
disadvantage of some person; 
This definition not only includes all of the different docu­
ments specifically listed in AS 11.25.010, 11.25.020, 11.25.060, 
11.25.070, 11.25.090, 11.20.430, and 11.20.440, but also 
includes such non-documentary articles as coins, 11.25.040; 
animal brands or identification marks, 11.20.180; and private 
trademarks or labels, 11.25.080. The defintion is also broad 
enough to cover such recent innovations as microfilm, electronic 
tape and computerized records. The effect of this definition 
is to restore the common law principle that forgery can be 
committed with respect to "any writing", as well as its modern 
day equivalents, which may be "the means of defrauding another. " 
See, N.Y. Penal Law§ 170.00, Commentary at 270. 
The Code Provision eliminates the element appearing 
in some of the current statutes that the forgery be accomplished 
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by "a person being or assuming to be an officer, agent or 
member of a private corporation or company. " AS 11.20. 430, 
440. Under the Revised Code, forgery can be committed by 
any person. 
TD AS 11. 56.500 also combines all the different 
methods of creating and passing forged instruments into a 
single crime. Under the Revised Code, forgery is committed 
if a person "falsely makes, completes, or alters a written 
instrument. " TD AS ll. 46. 580 (a) (1) , (2) and (3) define 
"falsely make", "falsely complete" and "falsely alter" to 
include the conduct currently covered by separate statutes 
on using a fictitious signature, AS 11.25.090; combining 
parts of genuine instruments, AS 11.25. 060; as well as the 
more general statutes on making, altering, forging or counter­
feiting, AS 11.25.010, 020, 070. TD AS 11.46.580 (b) (1) and 
(3) define "complete written instrument" and "incomplete 
written instrument, " both of which are used in the definitions 
of "falsely make, " "falsely complete" and "falsely alter." 
Under both existing law and the Revised Code, 
forgery is committed not only by the person who actually 
creates the instrument, but also by the person who uses the 
instrument knowing it to be forged. The different ways of 
using forged instruments are combined into the require-
ment of TD AS 11.56.500 (a) (2) that the defendant "utter" the 
instrument. "Utter" is defined in TD AS 11. 56. 580 (b) (5) 
to include all the various methods of making use of the 
instrument proscribed by existing law. 
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Finally, the Revised Code provides for a single 
state of mind - "intent to defraud" - to replace the bewildering 
variety of mental states required by the existing statutes. 
TD AS 11.56.580 (b) (4) (a) defines "intent to defraud" as "an 
intent to use deception or to injure someone's interest 
which has value." "Deception " is defined and discussed in the 
commentary to Chapter 46, Article 1, appearing in this report. 
TD AS ll.56.580(b) (4) (B) provides that an "intent to defraud" 
includes not only conduct undertaken for personal gain, but 
also acts performed with the knowledge that the actor is 
"facilitating fraud or injury to be perpetrated or inflicted 
by someone else. " This is to make it clear that a forger 
commits an offense even though he does not defraud the person 
to whom he sells or passes the forged instrument. For example, 
in Fairbanks recently a charge of forging residence cards 
was dismissed because the forger informed his buyers that the 
cards were forged. Under the Revised Code, that defendant would 
have been guilty of forgery because he knowingly ,rfacilitat[ed] 
a fraud or injury to be perpetrated or inflicted by someone else. " 
II. TD AS 11. 56.510 - CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A FORGED 
INSTRUMENT 
A. Existing Law 
Existing law includes at least two statutes which 
prohibit the mere possession of a forged instrument: AS 
11.25.040, Possession of Counterfeit Coins, and AS 11. 25.020, 
Possession of Forged Evidence of Debt. Both provisions require 
that the defendant know the article to be false and intend 
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"to utter or pass it as true and genuine." Possession of 
forged instruments other than those specified is not prohibited. 
B. The Code Provision 
The Revised Code provides that possession of any 
forged instrument is a crimi_nal offense if the defendant has 
knowledge that the instrument was forged, and intends to 
utter it. In providing that the penalty for possession of 
a forged instrument is identical to the penalty for forgery, 
the Revised Code recognizes that the threat to the community 
is essentially the same whether or not the possessor created 
the forgery himself. 
III. TD AS 11.46.520 - CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A FORGERY 
DEVICE 
A. Existing Law 
Existing law punishes the possessor or maker of 
a tool for counterfeiting coins with a 1-10 year sentence, 
AS 11.25.050, but punishes the maker or possessor of a tool 
for forging an evidence of debt with a 1-5 year sentence, 
AS 11.25.0 30. Both statutes require that the tool be 
"adapted and designed" for forgery, and that the possession 
be " with intent to use it or cause or permit it to be used" 
for forging. Existing law does not prohibit the possession 
of tools which can be used only to forge articles which are 
not coins or evidences of debt. 
B. The Code Provision 
TD AS 11.46.520 reaches back to a point before 
actual forgery commences to penalize those who possess 
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either (1) devices with little or no use other than forgery, 
or (2) other devices that can be adapted and are intended 
to be adapted for use in committing forgery. 
The statute combines the substance of the two 
existing provisions, but with two significant modifications: 
(1) the prohibition is extended to include devices for 
forging any "written instrument" as that term is defined in 
TD AS 11. 46. 580(6) , and (2) the manufacture or possession 
of a device specifically designed for use in counterfeiting 
or forging written instruments is made a criminal act by 
TD AS 11.46.520 (a) (1) , while an intent to use the device 
unlawfully is required only with respect to devices "capable 
of or adaptable to" use in such counterfeiting or forgery. 
TD AS 11. 4 6 . 5 2 0 (a) ( 2) . 
IV. TD AS 11.46.530 - CRIMINAL SIMULATION 
A. Existing Law 
Provisions in existing law covering the disguising 
of an object for criminal purposes include AS 11. 25. 120 and 
130, Adulterating Gold Dust and Possession of Adulterated 
Gold Dust, which were adopted in the days when gold dust 
was the principal currency in Alaska. The statutes require 
that the actor adulterate, pass or possess the gold dust with 
intent to pass it as true or genuine. 
Existing law also prohibits in AS 11.20. 510 the 
"sale or attempted sale" of 
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imitation gold nuggets manufactured of any material 
other than gold, nuggets manufactured of gold, or 
imitation Alaskan jade or ivory, or jewelry contain­
ing imitation gold nuggets, or nuggets manufactured 
of gold or imitation Alaskan jade or ivory, without 
having a label affixed, setting forth in legible 
type or writing the material used in the nuggets, 
jade or ivory, or jewelry containing the nuggets, 
jade or ivory .. . .  
B. The Code Provision 
The chief application of TD AS 11.46.530 is directed 
at fraudulent misrepresentation of antique or rare objects 
such as counterfeit paintings or other objects of art, 
antiques, books, manuscripts, archeological artifacts, and 
the like. The three provisions in existing law touch on 
this type of conduct, but there is no general provision 
covering this problem. While a completed transaction will 
amount to Theft, this statute allows intervention at a time 
even prior to the attempted passing of the simulated article. 
As noted in the commentary to the Proposed Michigan Revised 
Criminal Code, 
preparation of this sort of object shows careful advance 
planning, and since the monetary stakes are often very 
high, it appears appropriate to penalize the prepara­
tion as such, particularly when apprehension of the 
criminal after the final frauds have been perpetrated 
is often very difficult . . .. 
Proposed Michigan Revised Criminal Code§ 4025, Commentary 
at 272. 
V. TD AS 11.46.540 - OBTAINING A SIGNATURE BY DECEPTION 
A. Existing Law 
AS 11.20. 360, Obtaining Money or Property by False 
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Pretenses, provides for the punishment of a person " . . .  who 
obtains, or attempts to obtain, with intent to defraud, the 
signature of a person to a writing, the false making of 
which is a forgery . . .  " There has been no appellate decision 
interpreting the scope of this provision in Alaska, or in 
Oregon whose similar provision was repealed in 1973. 
B. The Code Provision 
TD AS 11. 46. 540 provides that a person commits a 
Class A misdemeanor if he "causes .another to sign or execute a 
written instrument by.deception" such as a letter of recommenda­
tion to a prospective employer. The definition of "deception" 
is discussed in this report in the commentary to Article 1, 
Theft and Related Offenses. 
To fall within this section, the signature must be 
obtained "with intent to defraud". The phrase "intent to 
defraud" is discussed, sup_!'.'a, at § I B. 
TD AS 11. 46.540 is necessary because the obtaining 
of the signature by deception will not always be covered by 
other sections of the Revised Code. The conduct is not 
Forgery, TD AS 11. 46.500, because the resulting document i s  
not a "forged written instrument. " The document i s  precisely 
what it purports to be - it just would not have been created 
without the defendant's deception. The conduct is also not 
Theft, TD AS 11. 46.100, because a signature is not "property", 
as required by that statute. 
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VI. TD AS 11. 46. 550 - OFFERING A FALSE INSTRUMENT FOR RECORDING 
A. Existing Law 
Existing law prohibits the procuring or offering 
of a "false or forged instrument to be filed, registered or 
recorded in a public office .. .. " AS 11.30. 270. 
B. The Code Provision 
The Revised Code punishes the fi�ing of a forged 
instrument in the public records just as it does any other 
uttering of a forged written instrument - as Forgery, TD AS 
11. 46.500. TD AS 1 1. 46.550 is necessary to cover the filing 
of a written instrument, done with an intent to defraud, 
knowing that it contains false statements or information. 
The coverage of this statute is limited to written 
instruments "relating to or affecting real or personal 
property or directly affecting a contractual relationship" 
because the files containing these documents are consulted 
and relied upon by the general public. False statements on 
an application to the government for a benefit, or on a 
form bearing notice that false statements within that form 
are punishable, are punished as Unsworn Falsification. 
TD AS 11. 56.200. False statements on notarized forms are 
punished as Perjury, TD AS 11. 56.210. 
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VIII. TD AS 11.46.570 - CRIMINAL IMPERSONATION 
A. Existing Law 
Assuming a false identity for a criminal purpose 
is prohibited by several different existing statutes If 
property is obtained, the impersonator has cor.unitted Larceny 
by Trick or False Personation, AS 11.20.200. He may also 
have violated AS ll i 20.450, False Pretense on Soliciting 
for an Organization; AS 11.20.500, Unauthorized Use of 
Badge or Emblem of Societies; or even AS 11.20. 410, 
Fraudulently Producing Heir. 
B. The Code Provision 
The Revised Code combines the various existing 
statutes into one section. A defendant who assumes a false 
identity or falsely claims to represent someone else commits 
criminal impersonation when he does an act in that character 
with intent to defraud. 
This statute can be used to arrest a professional 
con man as soon as he is discovered to be a fake, without 
having to take the risk of waiting for him to make substantial 
progress in his scheme. 
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Section 
9 8 0  Value of Property 
9 ()0  Definitions 
Sec. 1 1. Lf 6. 9 80 .  VALUE 01'' PROPERTY. (a)  In this chapter, whP.never 
it is nece s s ary t o  determine the value of property , that value is  the 
n,arke t value of  the property at  the time and p lace of the criminal act, 
unles s otherwis e  specified, or , if the market va lue cannot reas onably 
be  as certained, the cost  of rep lacement of the property within a 
reasonable time after the crime . 
(b) The value of  written in struments , exclus ive of public and 
corporate bonds and secur i ties and other instruments having a readily 
a s certainable market value, shall be determined in the followi.ng manner : 
( 1) the va 1 ue o f  an in:� trumcn t cor n; ti tuting an evidence of 
debt, includini_; but uot limited to a check, draft or promis sory note , 
is  the amount due or collected on the ins trument; 
(2 ) the value of any other instrume nt  that affects a valuable 
legal right , privilege or obligation shall be considered the greatest 
amount of economic loss wl1ich the owner of the instrument might reason-
3hly incur because of the lo ss  of the instrument. 
(c) In determining the degree of an offense under this chapter , 
amoun ts  involved in criminal acts committed under one cours e of conduct , 
whether from the same person or several persons , shall be aggregated. 
Sec. 11. 46. 990. DEFINITIONS. In this chap ter , unles s  the context 
otherwis e  requires ,  
( 1) "appropriate" or "appropriat e  property of another to one­
s elf or a third person" means to 
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(A) exercise control over proper ty of another, or to 
a i d  a third p erson to exercise  control over property of another , 
permanently or for so extended a period or under such circumstances 
as to acquire t he major port ion of the economic value or benefit of  
the prop erty ; or 
(B)  dispose of the property of another for the benefit 
of oneself or a third person ; 
(2) " deception" 
(A) means to knowin�ly 
(i) create or confirm another ' s  false impression 
of  law, value, intention or other state of  mind whi ch the de­
fendant does not believe to be true ; 
( i i) fail to correct a false impression which the 
defendant previously has created or confirmed; 
( i i i) prevent ano ther from acquiring information 
pert incnt to the d Ls pos it ion of the propc�r ty or service  
involved; 
(iv) sell or otherwise transfer or encumber pro­
perty failing to disclose a lien, adverse claim, or other 
legal impe diment to the enjoyment of the property, whether 
that impediment is or is not a matter of official record ; or 
(v) promise performance which the defendant does 
not intend to perform or knows will not be performed; 
(B) does not inc'lude falsity as to matters having no 
pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unl ikely to de­
ceive ordinary persons in the group addressed; 
(3) " deprive" or "deprive another of property" means to 
(A) withhold property of  another or cause property of 
another to be withheld from him permanently or for so extended a 
9 7 .  
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0  
1 1  
1 2  
1 3  
1 4  
1 5  
1 6  
1 7  
1 8  
1 9  
20 
2 1  
22 
23 
2S 
26 
27 
28 
, , 
period or under such circums tances that the maj or portion of its 
economic value or benefit is  lost to him ; 
(B) dispose of the property in such manner or under such 
circums tances as to  make it unlikely tha t the oi;-mer will recover 
the proper ty ; 
(C) retain the property of  ano ther with intent to re­
store i t  t o  him only if he  purchases or leases it back, or pays a 
reward or o ther compensation for its return ; 
( D )  sell, cive, pledge or  o therwise transfer any inter-
es t i n  the proper ty o f  ano ther ;  or 
(E) subject the p roperty of ano ther to the claim of a 
per son other than the owner; 
"fin.:1ncial ins l.:itution" means a b,:mk, insurance company , 
credit unlo11, hul ldi.ng and lonn association, investment trus t or other 
oreani zntion held out to the public as a place of depo s i t  of funds or 
mr'.dium of :i;-ivi.n[js or co l lectivc inve:; trnent ; 
(5) "�ovcrnmcnt" mc.:ins the Uni ted States, any st.:1tc  or nny 
lllUll i c .Lp:1 l i t: y  or  o thc t- pol .L t: i cal sub division within the Uni. tee! S tates or 
it: s  territories ;  any depar tmen t, ar,cncy or subc!:i.vision or any of the 
foregoing ; an organization carryini out the functions of government ;  or 
any corporution or acency formed under interstate compact or interna­
tional trec:1 ty. 
(6) "obtain" means 
(A) in relation to  property, t o  bring about  a transfer 
or a purported transfer of a legal interest in the property whether 
to the obtainer or ano ther or to  exert control over property of 
c:1nother ; or 
(B) in relation t o o s ervice, to secure performance of 
the service without payment for the service or by imposing payment 
on a third per�; on who did not request or use the service ; 
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( 7) "µroperty" mec1ns an article, substance or thing of 
vnlue , in c ludi.ng but not limi ted to money, taneible and intangible p er­
sonal proper ty, real property, choses - in- action, and evidence of debt 
or of contract ; a co�nodity of a puhJ.ic uti lity such as gas, electri­
city, steam, and water constitutes property but the supplying of such a 
commodity to premises from an outside source by means  of wires, pipes , 
conduits or other equipmen t sh_-:1. l l  be  cor nd.dcred a rendition of a ser­
vice rather than n su 1.e or delivery of p roperty; 
(8) "property of another" means property in which a person 
has an interest which the actor is not privileged to infringe, whether or 
not the actor aiso has an interest in the property. The term does not 
include property in the possession of the actor in which another has only 
a security interest, even if legal title is in the secured party pursuant 
to a conditional sales contract or other security agreement. In the 
absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, the holder of a security 
interest in property is not privileged to infringe the debtor's right of 
possession without consent ; 
( 9) "services" includes but is not necessarily limited to 
L1bor, p rofc s s :i.orwl services, transporta tion , telephone or other com­
rnuu icrit.Lons s ervi ce, entertainment, the supplying of food, lod�ing or 
other accommodations in hote ls, res t.1urants or elsewhere, admission to 
exhibitions and the supplyini of equipment for use ; 
(10)  
son ;  
" threat"  means 
(A) a menace, hmvcver, communicated, t o  
(i) cause physical inj ury in the future to  a per-
(ii) cause damage to property ; 
(iii) subject a person to physical confinement or 
res tr a int; 
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( iv) engage in other conduct constituting a crime ; 
(v) accuse a person of a crime or cause cr iminal 
charges  to be instituted against a person; 
(vi) expose a secret or pub l icize an asserted fact, 
whether true or false, tending to subject a person to hatred, 
contempt or ridicule or to  impair his credit or business re­
pute ; 
(vi i) testify or provide information or withhold 
testimony or informa t ion wi th  respect to another ' s  legal 
claim or defense ; 
(viii) use or abuse one ' s  position as a public 
servant by performing some act wi thin or related to h is 
official duties , or by  fai ling or refusing to perform an 
of f ic i.:11 duty, in such manner as to affect some person ad­
versely ; 
(ix) br ing about or con tinue a strike, boycott or 
other collec b.ve action, if the proper ty is not demanded or 
received for the benef it o f  the group in whose interest the 
actor purports to act ; or  
(x) in flic t  .:my other honn ,vhich ,voulcl no t benefit 
the person making the t hreat ; 
(B) the offer to protect another person from an act 
descr ibed in (A) o f  this paraBraph when the offeror has  no apparent 
means to provide tl1c protec t ion or when the pr ice asked for render­
ing the protective service is grossly disproportionate to  its cost 
to the offeror. 
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APPENDIX I. 
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
Chapter 46 - Offenses Against Property 
DERIVATIONS 
ARTICLE 1 - THEFT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
TD AS 11.46.100-190 - Consolidated Theft Statutes 
These sections are based on ORS 164.015-065 and 
ORS 164.085-095. 
TD AS 11.46.195 - Extortion 
This section is based on ORS 164.075. 
TD AS 11.46.200 - Theft of Services 
This section is based on ORS 164.125. 
TD AS 11.46.210 - Theft by Failure to Make Required 
Disposition of Funds Received 
This section is based on Hawaii Penal Code§ 708-830(7). 
TD AS 11.46.220; 230 - Concealment of Merchandise; 
Reasonable Detention as a Defense 
These sections are based on existing AS 11.20.275; 277. 
TD AS 11.46.240 - Unauthorized Use of Propelled Vehicle 
This section is based on ·oRS 164.135 and existing 
AS 28.35.010. 
TD AS 11.46.250 - Unauthorized Occupancy of a 
Propelled Vehicle 
This section is based on Proposed Michigan Revised 
Criminal Code§ 3235. 
TD AS 11.46.260; 270 - Removal of Identification 
Marks, Unlawful Possession 
These sections are based on Hawaii Penal Code 
§§ 708-838; 839. 
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ARTICLE 2 - BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS 
TD AS 11.46.300; 310 - Burglary in the First and 
Second Degrees 
These sections are based on ORS 164.215; 225. 
TD AS 11. 46.320; 330 - Criminal Trespass in the 
First and Second Degrees 
These sections are based on ORS 104.245; 255. 
TD AS 11.46.340 - Defense: Emergency use of Premises 
This section is based on existing AS 11.20.135. 
TD AS 11.46.350 - Definitions 
This section is based on New York Penal Law§ 140. 00(5). 
ARTICLE 3 - ARSON, CRL'1Hi AL MISCHIEF AND RELATED OFFENSES 
TD AS 11.46.400; 410 - Arson in the First and 
Second Degrees 
These sections are based on ORS 164.315; 325. 
TD AS 11.46.420 - Reckless Burning 
This section is based on ORS 164.335. 
TD AS 11.46.430 - Criminally Negligent Burning 
This section is based on existing AS 11.15.340. 
TD AS 11. 46. 450 - Failure to Control or Report a 
Dangerous Fire 
This section is based on New Jersey Proposed 
Penal Code§ 2C:17-l(c). 
TD AS 11.46. 490 - Definitions 
This section is based on ORS 164.305 and 
AS 41.15.170(3). 
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ARTICLE 4 - FORGERY AND RELATED OFFENSES 
TD AS 11.46.500 - Forgery 
This section is based on ORS 165.007. 
TD AS 11.46. 510 - Criminal Possession of a Forged 
Instrument 
This section is based on ORS 165. 017. 
TD AS 11.46. 520 - Criminal Possession of a Forgery 
Device 
This section is based on ORS 165.032. 
TD AS 11.46.530 - Criminal Simulation 
This section is based on ORS 165.037. 
TD AS 11.46.540 - Obtaining a Signature by Deception 
This section is based on Proposed Michigan Revised 
Criminal Code§ 4030. 
TD AS 11.46.550 - Offering a False Instrument 
for Recording 
This section is Lased Oft Proposed Michigan Revised 
Criminal Code§ 4035. 
TD AS 11. 46.570 - Criminal Impersonation 
This section is based on Proposed Michigan Revised 
Criminal Code§ 4055. 
TD AS 11.46.580 - Definitions 
With the exception of TD AS ll.46.580(b) (4), these 
definitions are based on ORS 165.002. TD AS ll.46. 580(b) (4) 
is based on Proposed Michigan Revised Criminal Code§ 400l(b). 
ARTICLE 6 - GENERAL PROVISIONS 
TD AS 11.46.980 - Value of Property 
Subsections (a) and (b) are based on ORS 164.115 
(1) and (2). Subsection {c) is based on Proposed Michigan 
Revised Criminal Code§ 320l(m). 
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TD AS 11.46.990 - Definitions 
Subsection (1) is based on ORS 164.005(1). 
Subsection (2) is based on ORS 164.085(1) (a) - (e) 
and (2). 
Subsection (3) is based on ORS 164.005(2) and Proposed 
Michigan Revised Criminal Code§ 3201(b). 
Subsections (4) and (5) are based on Proposed 
Michigan Revised Criminal Code§ 3201(c) and (a). 
Subsection (6) is based on ORS 164.005 and Proposed 
Michigan Revised Criminal Code§ 3201(c). 
Subsection (7) is based on ORS 164.005(5) and 
Proposed Michigan Revised Criminal Code§ 320l(i). 
Subsection (8) is based on§ 708-800(16) of the 
Hawaii Penal Code, ORS 164.105(3) and N.Y. Revised Penal 
Law§ 155.00(5). 
Subsection (9) is based on Proposed Michigan 
Revised Criminal Code§ 3220(2). 
Subsection (10) (A) is based on ORS 164.075(1) (a)-(i). 
Subsection (10) (B) is based on existing AS ll.20. 345(c). 
104. 
APPENDIX II 
EXISTING LAW 
ARTICLE 1. THEFT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
Sec. 11.20.140. LARCENY OF MONEY OR PROPERTY. 
A person who steals money, goods, or chattels, or a 
government note, a bank note, promissory note, bill of 
exchange, bond, or other thing in action, or a book of 
accounts, order or certificate concerning money or goods 
due or to become due or to be delivered, or a deed or 
writing containing a conveyance of land or interest in 
land, or a bill of sale, or writing containing a con­
veyance of goods or chattels or interest in them, or 
any other valuable contract in force, or a receipt, 
release, or defeasance, or a writ, process, or public 
record, which is the property of another, is guilty of 
larceny. Upon conviction, if the property stolen 
exceeds $250 in value, a person guilty of larceny is 
punishable by imprisonment for not less than one nor 
more than 10 years. If the property stolen does not 
exceed $250 in value, the person, upon conviction, is 
punishable by imprisonment for not less than one month 
nor more than one year, or by a fine of not less than 
$25 nor more than $250, or by both. 
Sec. 11. 20.145. DRIVING OR TAKING WATERCRAFT OR 
AIRCRAFT WITHOUT THE OWNER'S CONSENT. (a) A person 
who drives, tows away, or takes a watercraft or an 
aircraft not his own without the consent of the owner, 
With intent temporarily to deprive the owner of posses­
sion of the watercraft or aircraft or a person who is 
a party or accessory to or an accomplice in the unauthor­
ized driving, towing, or taking, is guilty of a misde­
meanor, and upon conviction is punishable by imprison­
ment for not more than one year, or by a fine of not 
more than $1,000, 6r by both. The consent of the 
owner of a watercraft or an aircraft to its driving, 
towing away, or taking shall not be presumed or 
implied because of the owner's consent on previous 
occasions to the driving, towing away or taking of 
the watercraft or aircraft by the same or a different 
person. 
(b) When a minor is accused of violations under 
this section he may be charged, prosecuted, and 
sentenced in the same manner as an adult, except that 
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a parent, guardian or legal custodian shall be present 
at all proceedings against the minor. 
(c) In this section 
(1) "watercraft" means and includes any device 
upon or by which a person or property is or may be 
transported or drawn upon water; 
(2) "aircraft" means a device which was designed 
and meant to be used for the transportation of person 
or property above the surface of the earth or water; 
(3) "person" does not include a United States 
marshal or his deputy, a state policeman, or any other 
peace officer who drives, tows away or otherwise takes 
a watercraft or an aircraft with authority under law 
to do so. 
Sec. 11. 20 .146. CONVICTION IN LARCENY PROSECUTION. 
In a criminal prosecution for larceny, if the facts do 
not warrant a conviction of the defendant for larceny, 
he may, nevertheless, be convicted of a violation of 
§ 145 of this chapter if the facts so warrant. 
Sec. 11.20.150. LARCENY IN BUILDING OR VESSEL. 
A person who commits the crime of larceny in a dwelling 
house, banking house, office, store, shop, or warehouse, 
or in a ship, steamboat, or other ves.s·el, or who breaks 
and enters in the night or daytime a church, courthouse, 
meeting house, town house, college, academy, or other 
building erected or used for public uses, and commits 
the crime of larceny in it, is punishable by imprison­
ment in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more 
than seven years. 
Sec. 11.20.160. LARCENY OF ANIMALS. A person 
who commits the crime of larceny by stealing a horse, 
gelding, mare, colt, mule, ass, jenny, bull, steer, 
cow, calf, goat, sheep, reindeer, fox, dog or other 
animal, upon conviction, is punishable, 
(1) if the property stolen exceeds $50 in value, 
by imprisonment in the pen itentiary for not less than 
nne nor more than 10 years; 
(2) if the property stolen does not exceed $50 
in value, by imprisonment in jail for not less than 
one month nor more than one year, or by a fine of not 
less than $25 nor more than $100. 
Sec. 11.20. 190. LARCENY OF MINERALS. A person 
who takes, removes or conceals any ore, mineral, 
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amalgam, precipitates, concentrates, or other mineral­
bearing substance, from a mine, sampler, smelter, 
concentrating mill, chlorination mill, cyanide mill, 
or other reduction works, with the intent to steal it 
or to defraud the owner of it, is guilty of grand 
larceny, and upon conviction is punishable by imprison­
ment in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor 
more than 10 years. 
Sec. 11.20.200. LARCENY BY TRICK OR FALSE PERSONA­
TION. A person who falsely personates or represents 
another, and in that assumed character receives or obtains 
money, labor or property intended to be delivered to the 
person personated or represented, with intent to defraud 
or to convert it to his own use, or who knowingly by a 
false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defrauds 
another person of money, labor or property, is guilty 
of larceny and upon conviction is punishable accordingly. 
Sec. 11.20.260. RETENTION OF LOST PROPERTY. A 
person who finds lost property and appropriates it 
to his own use or to the use of another person not 
entitled to it, without (1) immediately or within a 
reasonable time advertising that fact in a paper of 
general circulation published nearest the place where 
found, and setting out a full and true description of 
the property, with marks of identification, if any, or 
(2) notifying the peace officer nearest to the place 
where found and giving a full and true description of 
the property, together with the time, place and 
circumstances under which found, is guilty of larceny 
and is punishable as provided in§ 140 of this chapter. 
The finder of the property may retain it until reim­
bursed for the cost of advertising and preserving or 
protecting the property. 
Sec. 11.20.275. CONCEALMENT OF MERCHAND ISE. 
(a) A person who, without authority, wilfully con­
ceals upon or about his person the goods or merchan­
dise of a retail business establishment, not there­
tofore purchased by the person, while still upon the 
premises of the retail business establishment, with 
intent to deprive the owner of the goods or merchan­
dise, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon 
conviction, is punishable by a fine of not more than 
$500, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, 
or by both. 
10 7. 
(b) Goods or merchandise found concealed upon 
or about the person and which have not theretofore 
been purchased by the person are prima facie evidence 
of a wilful concealment. 
Sec. 11.20.276. SUBSEQUENT CONVICTION FOR CON­
CEALMENT. A person found guilty of a second or sub­
sequent offense of wilful concealment of goods as 
defined in§ 275 of this chapter is guilty of a m is­
demeanor and is punishable in the discretion of the 
court. 
Sec. 11.20.277. REASONABLE DETENTION AS DEFENSE. 
(a) In a civil or criminal action brought by a person 
having been detained on or in the immediate vicinity 
of the premises of a mercantile establishment for the 
purpose of investigation or questioning as to the 
ownership of merchandise, it is a defense that the 
person was detained in a reasonable manner and for not 
more than a reasonable time to permit investigation or 
questioning by a peace officer or by the owner of the 
mercantile establishment, his authorized employee or 
agent, and that the peace officer, owner, employee or 
agent had reasonable grounds to believe that the per­
son detained was committing or attempting to commit a 
crime as defined in§ 275 of this chapter. 
(b) In this section "reasonable grounds" includes 
knowledge that a person has concealed upon or about 
his person unpurchased merchandise of the mercantile 
establishment, and reasonable time means the time 
necessary to permit the person detained to make a 
statement or to refuse to make a statement, and also 
the time necessary to examine employees and records of 
the mercantile establishment relative to the ownership 
of the merchandise. 
Sec. 11.20.280. EMBEZZLEMENT BY EMPLOYEE OR SERVANT. 
An officer, agent, clerk, employee, or servant who em­
bezzles or fraudulently converts to his own use, or takes 
or secretes with intent to embezzle or fraudulently con­
vert to his own use, money, property, or thing of another 
which may be the subject of larceny, and which has come 
into his possession or is under his care by virtue of 
his employment is guilty of embezzlement. If the p�operty 
embezzled exceeds $100 in value, a person g·uilty of 
embezzlement is punishable by imprisonment in the peni­
tentiary for not less than one year nor more than 10 
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years. If the property embezzled does not exceed 
th.e value of $100, a person guilty of embezzlement 
is punishable by imprisonment in a jail for not 
less than one month nor more than one year, or by 
a fine of not less than $25 nor more than $100. 
Sec. 11. 20. 290. EMBEZZLEMENT BY BAILEE. ( a) 
A bailee, with or without hire, who embezzles, or 
wrongfully converts to his own use, or who secretes, 
with intent to convert to his own use, or who fails, 
neglects, or refuses to deliver,· keep, or account for, 
according to the nature of his trust, money or prop­
erty of another delivered or entrusted to his care 
or control which may be the subject of larceny is 
guilty of embezzlement and is punishable as provided 
in§ 280 of this chapter. 
(b) If a bailee receives grain from different 
bailors, and mixes and stores it together in bulk, 
it is not necessary to charge in the indictment or 
prove on the trial that the ownership of the grain is 
in more than one bailor. 
(c) A mortgagor of personal property having 
possession of property mortgaged is a bailee within 
the meaning of this section. 
Sec. 11. 20. 300. EMBEZZLEMENT OF PUBLIC MONEY. A 
person who receives money for the state or a borough, 
town or other municipal or public corporation, or who 
has in his possession money belonging to the state, 
borough, town, or other municipal or public corpora­
tion, or in which any of the foregoing has an interest, 
and who converts it or any portion to his own use or 
loans it or any portion, or neglects or refuses to pay 
it or any portion over as required by law, or when 
lawfully demanded to do so, is guilty of embezzlement, 
and upon conviction is punishable by imprisonment in 
the penitentiary for not less than one year nor more 
than 15 years, and by a fine equal to twice the amount 
converted, loaned, or neglected or refused to be paid. 
Sec. 11. 20.310. JURY ASCERTAINS AMOUNT OF PUBLIC 
MONEY EMBEZZLED. In a prosecution under§ 300 of this 
chapter the amount of the money converted, loaned, or 
neglected or refused to be paid shall be ascertained 
by the verdict of the jury as near as may be. 
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Sec. 11.20. 320. CLAIM AGAINST STATE, ETC., NOT 
A DEFENSE. The defendant in a prosecution under§ 300 
of this chapter may not set up or prove a private 
demand which he may have or claim to have against the 
state, borough, town, or other municipal or public 
corporation as a defense. 
Sec. 11.20.330. EMBEZZLEMENT BY TRUSTEE. A 
trustee of property for the benefit of another, or 
for a public or charitable use, who, with intent to 
defraud, converts the property or any portion to his 
own use or benefit, or to the use and benefit of another 
not entitled to it, is punishable in accordance with 
§ 280 of this chapter. 
Sec. 11.20.340. EMBEZZLEMENT BY FIDUCIARY. A 
banker, broker, merchant, attorney, or agent, entrusted 
with the property of another, who, with intent to 
defraud, converts the property or any portion to his 
.own use or benefit, or to the use or benefit of another 
not entitled to it, upon conviction, is punishable in 
accordance with§ 280 of this chapter. 
Sec. 11.20. 345. EXTORTION. (a) A person is guilty 
of extortion if he obtains the property of a person 
by threatening to or suggesting that he or another 
may 
(1) inflict bodily injury on anyone, except 
under circumstances constituting robbery, or commit 
any other criminal offense; 
(2) accuse anyone of a criminal offense; 
(3) expose confidential information or a secret, 
whether true or false, tending to subject a person 
to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair his 
credit or business repute; 
(4) take or withhold action as a public official, 
or cause a public official to take or withhold action; 
(5) bring about or continue a strike, boycott or 
other collective unofficial action, if the property 
is not demanded or received for the benefit of the 
group in whose interest the person making the threat 
or suggestion purports to act; 
(6) testify or provide information or withhold 
testimony or information with respect to a person's 
legal claim or defense; or 
(7) inflict any other harm which would not benefit 
the person making the threat or suggestion. 
(b) A person who is convicted of extortion is 
punishable by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by 
imprisonment for not more than five years, or by both. 
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(c) A threat or suggestion to perform any of 
the acts described in (a) of this section includes 
an offer to protect another from any harmful act 
when the offerer has no apparent means to provide 
the protection or where the price asked for rendering 
the protection service is grossly disproportionate 
to its cost to the offeror. 
(d) It is a defense to prosecution based on 
(a) (2), (3) or (4) of this section that the property 
obtained by threat of accusation, exposure, lawsuit 
or other invocation of official action was honestly 
claimed as restitution or indemnification for harm 
done in the circumstances to which the accusation, 
exposure, lawsuit or other official action relates, 
or as compensation for property or lawful services. 
Sec. 11. 20.350. BUYING, RECEIVING, OR CONCEALING 
STOLEN PROPERTY. (a) A person who buys, receives, 
or conceals money, goods, bank notes, or other thing 
which may be the subject of larceny and which has 
been taken, embezzled, or stolen from another person, 
knowing it to have been taken, embezzled, or stolen, 
is upon conviction punishable by a fine of not more 
than $1,000 and by imprisonment for not less than 
one year nor more than three years if the property 
exceeds $250 in value; if the property bought, received, 
or concealed does not exceed $250 in value, by impri­
sonment for not less than one month nor more than one 
year or by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than 
$250. 
(b) A person or his agent, employee, or repre­
sentative whose principal business is dealing in or 
collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal 
property, who buys or receives property which has 
been stolen is rebuttably presumed to have bought 
or received the property knowing it was stolen if a 
person in his capacity should have reasonably inquired 
as to whether the person from whom the property was 
bought or received had the legal right to sell or 
deliver it, and he failed to make the inquiry. 
(c) In addition to the criminal penalty pro­
vided in (a) of this section, a person who violates 
this section is liable in a civil action to the 
owner of the stolen property for three times the 
amount of actual damages sustained by him by the loss 
of the property, as well as all costs and reasonable 
attorney fees. 
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Sec. 11.20.360. OBTAINING MONEY OR PROPERTY BY 
FALSE PRETENSES. A person who, by false pretenses or 
by a privy or false token, and with intent to defraud, 
obtains, or attempts to obtain money or property from 
another, or who obtains, or attempts to obtain, with 
intent to defraud, the signature of a person to a writ­
ing, the false making of which is a forgery, upon con­
viction, is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary 
for not less than one nor more than five years. 
Sec. 11.20.370. TRANSFER OR MORTGAGE AS FALSE 
PRETENSE. The making of a bill of sale, assignment, 
or mortgage of personal property by a person not the 
owner for the purpose of obtaining money or credit 
or to secure an existing indebtedness is a false 
pretense within the meaning of§ 360 of this chapter. 
Sec. 11.20.390. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE. A person 
who falsely and knowingly represents that he is the owner 
of land to which he has no title, or falsely represents 
that he is the owner of an interest or estate in land, 
and executes a conveyance with intent to defraud another, 
upon conviction, is punishable by imprisonment in the 
penitentiary for not less than six months nor more than 
two years. 
Sec. 11.20.400. FRAUDULENT SALE OF PERSONALTY 
SUBJECT TO SECURITY INTEREST. A person who, with intent 
to defraud, conveys goods, chattels, or personal property 
to which he does not have title or which is subject to 
a lien, pledge, conditional sale contract, mortgage or 
other security interest without informing the buyer of 
the existence and effect of the security interest, upon 
conviction, is punishable by imprisonment in a jail 
for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than 
$500, or by both. 
Sec. 11.20.450. FALSE PRETENSES ON SOLICITING 
FOR ORGANIZATIONS. A person who, by oral or written 
words, or by acts or conduct, falsely represents or 
pretends to be a member or authorized agent or repre­
sentative of a religious, fraternal, beneficial, or 
charitable society, or association, or other organiza­
tion of any kind, and, while engaged in making a false 
representation or pretense, or by means of a false re­
presentation or pretense, obtains from a person, money 
or written promise to pay money or other property is 
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guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction is punish­
able by a fine of not more than $100, or by imprisonment 
in jail for not more than three months, or by both. 
Sec. 11.20.480. DEFRAUDING HOTEL, BOARDINGHOUSE, 
CAMPGROUND, TRAILER COURT, BAR OR RESTAURANT OPERATOR. 
(a) A person who puts up at a hotel, inn, boardinghouse, 
lodginghouse, campground or trailer court and who procures 
a fare, board, lodging, or lodging services from the 
owner or operator by means of a trick, deception, or 
false representation, or a false show of baggage or effects, 
or who procures food, drink or other merchandise from 
any restaurant, dining room, cocktail lounge, bar or 
other premises where food or drink is offered to the 
public for sale, with the intent to cheat or defraud the 
owner or operator out of the pay for the fare, board, 
lodging, lodging services, or accommodation, or food, 
drink or merchandise; or who with that intent absconds 
from the premises, or surreptitiously removes, or causes 
to be removed baggage or effects from a hotel, inn, 
boardinghouse, lodginghouse, campground or trailer 
court without first paying the proper charges due is 
guilty of a misdemeanor. The words "fare, board, lodging 
or lodging services" include all charges incurred except 
for cash payouts to a guest. 
(b) Proof that fare, board, lodging, lodging 
services, food, drink or merchandise were obtained by 
false pretenses, or that the person refused or 
neglected to pay for the fare, board, lodging, lodging 
services, food, drink or merchandise on demand, or that 
he gave payment for the fare, board, lodging, lodging 
services, food, drink or merchandise with negotiable 
paper or credit card voucher upon which payment was 
refused is prima facie evidence of the fraudulent intent 
required in (a) of this section. 
(c) In this section 
(1) "campground and trailer court" means an improved 
site intended for use by the public for the purpose of 
transient habitation on the site or providing space for 
transient habitation in cabins, tents, mobile homes, 
trail�rs or recreational vehicles; 
(2) "lodging services" means charges for electricity, 
water, sewage, or other services received in a campground 
or trailer court. 
Sec. 11. 2 0. 4 9 5. FRAUDULENT USE OF TELECOMMUNlCATIONS 
SERVICE. A person is guilty of a misdemeano£, and 
upon conviction is punishable by imprisonment for not 
more than one year, or by a fine of not more than 
$1, 000, or by both, if h�, with intent to defraud 
or to aid and abet another to defraud a person of the 
lawful charge, in whole or in part, for a telecommuni­
cation service, including cable television, obtains or 
attempts to obtain, or aids and abets another to obtain 
or to attempt to obtain a telecommunication service 
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(1) by charging the service to an existing 
telephone number or credit card number without the 
authority of the subscriber to it or the legitimate 
holder of it; 
(2) by charging the service to a nonexistent, 
false, fictitious, or counterfeit telephone number 
or credit card number or to a suspended, terminated, 
expired, canceled, or revoked telephone number or credit 
card number; 
(3) by use of a code, prearranged scheme, or other 
similar stratagem or device by which the person, in 
effect, sends or receives information; 
(4) by any other trick, stratagem, impersonation, 
false pretense, false representation, false statement, 
contrivance, device or means; or 
(5) by the unauthorized connection of wires or 
cable to cable television service lines. 
Sec. 11.20.525. STEALING, REMOVING OR DAMAGING 
PARTS OF AN AIRCRAFT. (a) A person who wilfully or 
maliciously steals, removes, damages or in any other 
manner interferes with any part of an aircraft without 
the consent of owner shall be punished, upon convic­
tion, by imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or 
by a fine of not more than $10, 000, or by both. 
(b) In this section ''aircraft tt means a device 
which was designed and meant to be used for the 
transportation of person or property above the surface 
of the earth or water. 
Sec. 28.35.010. DRIVING A VEHICLE WITHOUT OWNER'S 
CONSENT. (a) A person who drives, tows away, or takes 
a vehicle not his own without the consent of the owner, 
with intent temporarily to deprive the owner of posses­
sion of the vehicle, or a person who is a party or 
accessory to or an accomplice in the driving or unauthorized 
taking is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction 
is punishable by imprisonment for not less than 30 days 
nor more than one year, and by a fine of not less than 
$100 nor more than $1, 000. Upon a conviction for a second 
or subsequent offense, the offender may be charged with 
a felony, and if so charged and convicted, is punishable 
by imprisonment for. not more than three years, or by a 
fine of not more than $5, 000. The court may, upon con­
viction of a second or subsequent violation of this 
section, suspend the offender's license to drive a motor 
vehicle for a period of not to exceed three years. The 
consent of the owner of a vehicle to its driving, towing 
away, or taking shall not be presumed or implied because 
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of the owner's consent on previous occasions to the driving, 
towing away or taking of the vehicle by the same or a 
different person. 
(b) Repealed by§ 20 ch 241 SLA 1976. 
(c) The word "person" as used in this section does 
not include a United States marshal or his deputy, a 
state policeman, or any other peace officer who drives, 
tows away, or otherwise takes a vehicle with authority 
under law to do so. 
(d) When a minor is accused of violations under 
this section he may be charged� prosecuted, and sen­
tenced in the same manner as an adult, except that a 
parent, guardian or legal custodian shall be present 
at all proceedings against the minor. 
ARTICLE 2. BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS 
Sec. 11.20.080. BURGLARY IN DWELLING HOUSE. A 
person who breaks and enters a dwelling house with 
intent to commit a crime in it, or having entered 
with that intent, breaks a dwelling house or is 
armed with a dangerous weapon in it, or assaults a 
person lawfully in it is guilty of burglary, and 
upon conviction is punishable by imprisonment in the 
penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than 
10 years. However, if the burglary is committed at 
nighttime, it is punishable by imprisonment for not 
less than one year nor more than 15 years. If a 
human being is within the dwelling at the time of 
the burglary during the n ighttime or daytime, it is 
punishable by imprisonment for not less than one year 
nor more than 20 years. 
Sec. 11. 20.090. BREAKING OF DWELLING HOUSE 
DEFINED. An unlawful entry of a dwelling house with 
intent to commit a crime in it is a breaking and 
entering of the dwelling house for the purposes of 
§ 80 of this chapter. 
Sec. 11.20.100. BURGLARY NOT IN DWELLING HOUSE. 
A person who breaks and enters a building within the 
curtilage of a dwell ing house but not forming a part 
of it, or who breaks and enters a building or part 
of it, or a booth, tent, railway car, vessel, boat, 
or other structure or erection in which property is 
kept, with intent to steal or to commit a felony in 
it, is guilty of burglary, and upon conviction is 
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for 
not less than two nor more than five years. 
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Sec. 11. 20 . 110. BREAKING DEFINED FOR PURPOSE OF 
§ 100 OF THIS CHAPTER. Every unlawful entry of a 
building, booth, tent, railway car, vessel, boat� or 
other structure or erection mentioned in§ 100 of this 
chapter, with intent to steal or commit a felony, is 
a breaking and entering within the meaning of§ 100 
of this chapter. 
Sec. 11.20.120. BURGLARY IN LEAVING DWELLING 
HOUSE. A person who, having committed or attempted 
to commit a crime in the dwelling house of another, 
breaks an outer door, window shutter, or other 
part of the dwelling house, to get out of it, is 
guilty of burglary, and upon conviction is punish­
able by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not 
less than one nor more than three years. 
Sec. 11.20.130. DWELLING HOUSE DEFINED. A 
building is a dwelling house within the meaning of 
§§ 80-120 of this chapter if a part of it has 
usually been occupied by a person lodging in it and 
any structure joined to or immediately connected 
with the building. 
Sec. 11.20.135. UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY, USE OR OCCUPANCY 
OF PROPERTY. (a) It is unlawful for a person to enter, 
use or occupy any occupied or unoccupied dwelling, house, 
tent, hotel, office, store, shop, warehouse, barn, 
factory or other building, boat, ship, motor vehicle, 
railroad car or structure, or apartment, cottage, club­
house, bathhouse, hunting or fishing lodge, garage or 
any other structure, or use any personal property 
therein, except with the consent of the owner of the 
facility or his agent. However, a person may enter, use 
or occupy an unoccupied structure specified in this 
section without the consent of the owner if 
(1) the entry, use or occupancy of the facility 
is for an emergency in the case of immediate and dire 
need, and 
(2) the person contacts the owner or agent within 
15 days after using the facility or, if the owner is 
unknown, the nearest state or local police agency, and 
makes a report of the time of the entry, use or occu­
pancy of the facility and any damage to the facility 
or personal property, unless notice waiving necessity 
of the report is posted in the facility by the owner 
or his agent. 
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(b) A person who violates (a) of this section is 
guilty of a misdemeanor. 
(c) A court having jurisdiction to impose sentence 
for violation of (a) of this section may suspend all or 
part of a sentence on condition, among any other which 
might be lawfully ordered by the court, that the defendant 
make restitution for, or repair, any damage he has 
caused or compensate the owner for property used or 
consumed. 
(d) The Department of Public Safety shall provide 
forms upon which reports required by this section can 
be made and shall supply the forms to all local and 
state police agencies in the state for public distri­
bution. The department may adopt rules and regulations 
regarding reports required under this section. 
(e) In this section "occupied" means that the 
premises are being used by one who is entitled to their 
enjoyment and use, and this includes actual as well as 
constructive occupancy. 
Sec. 11.20. 610. TRESPASSING ON IMPROVED LANDS. 
A person who wilfully enters the garden, orchard, or 
other improved lands of another, or in his possession, 
with intent to cut, take, carry away, destroy, or 
injure the trees, grain, grass, hay, fruit, or vegetable 
products growing there, upon convictiori, is punishable 
by imprisonment in a jail for not more than six months, 
or by a fine of not more than $250, or by both. 
Sec. 11.20.630. TRESPASS. A person other than 
an officer on lawful business who trespasses on lands 
or premises in the lawful occupation of another, and 
fails, neglects, or refuses to depart immediately and 
remain away until permitted to return upon the verbal, 
printed or written notice of the owner or person in 
the lawful occupation of the lands or premises, is guilty 
of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction is punishable 
by a fine of not more than $250, and shall be committed, 
in default of payment of the fine and costs imposed, to 
one day for each $5 of the fine and costs. 
Sec. 11.20.640. EVIDENCE OF NOTICE TO TRESPASSERS. 
A printed or written notice with the name of the owner 
or person in the lawful occupation of the lands or 
premises attached by authority, requiring all persons 
not to trespass and to depart, which is posted in 
three conspicuous places on the lands or premises, 
and if the perimeter of the lands or premises equals 
117. 
or is greater than 330 feet, also posted along the 
boundaries of the lands, not less than 330 feet apart 
and at all roads and entrances, is prima facie evidence 
of the notice mentioned in§ 630 of this chapter. 
Sec. 11.20.650. TRESPASS ON MINING CLAIMS. A 
person who breaks or robs or attempts to break or rob 
a flume, rocker, quartz, quartz vein, or lode, bed­
rock, sluice, sluice box, or mining claim not his 
own, or who trespasses upon a mining claim, with the 
intent to commit a felony, upon conviction, is punish­
able by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less 
than one year nor more than five years, or by a fine 
of not less than $100 nor more than $1, 000, or by both. 
ARTICLE 3, ARSON, CRIMINAL MISCHIEF AND RELATED OFFENSES 
Sec. 11. 20.010. FIRST DEGREE ARSON. A person who 
wilfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes 
to be burned or who aids, counsels or procures the 
burning of a dwelling house, whether occupied, unoccu­
pied or vacant, or a kitchen, shop, barn, stable or 
other outhouse that is a part of a dwelling, or belongs 
to or adjoins a dwelling, whether his property or the 
property of another, is guilty of arson in the first 
degree, and upon conviction is punishable by imprison­
ment for not less than two nor more than 20 years. 
Sec. 11. 20.020. SECOND DEGREE ARSON. A person 
who wilfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or 
causes to be burned, or who aids, counsels or procures 
the burning of a guilding or structure of any kind, 
whether his property or the property of another, not 
included or described in§ 10 of this chapter, is guilty 
of arson in the second degree, and upon conviction is 
punishable by imprisonment for not less than one nor 
more than 10 years, or by a fine of not more than $5,000, 
or by both. 
Sec. 11. 20.030. THIRD DEGREE ARSON. A person who 
wilfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes 
to be burned, or who aids, counsels or procures the 
burning of personal property of another of the value of 
$100 is guilty of arson in the third degree, and upon 
conviction is punishable by imprisonment for not less 
than one nor more than three years, or by a fine of not 
more than $3, 000, or by both. 
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Sec. 11.20.040. OFFENSE BY MARRIED PERSON. Sec­
tions 10-30 of this chapter extend to and include a 
married person who commits any of the crimes specified, 
though the property burned or set on fire belongs 
wholly or in part to the other spouse. 
Sec. 11.20.050. FOURTH DEGREE ARSON. A person 
who wilfully and maliciously attempts to set fire to 
or attempts to burn or to aid, counsel or procure the 
burning of a building or property mentioned in 
§§ 10-40 of this chapter, or who commits an act 
preliminary to an attempt, or in furtherance of 
an attempt is guilty of arson in the fourth degree, 
and upon conviction is punishable by imprisonment 
for not less than one nor more than two years, or 
a fine not to exceed $1,000, or by both. 
Sec. 11.20.060. ATTEMPTED ARSON DEFINED. The 
placing or distributing of a flammable, explosive 
or combustible material or substance, or a device 
in a building or property mentioned in§§ 10-50 of 
this chapter in an arrangement or preparation with 
intent to eventually, wilfully and maliciously set 
fire to or burn, or to procure the setting fire to 
or burning of the building or property is, for the 
purposes of this chapter, an attempt to burn the 
building or property. 
Sec. 11.20.070. BURNING TO DEFRAUD INSURER. 
A person who wilfully and with intent to injure or 
defraud the insurer sets fire to or burns or attempts 
to set fire to or burn or who causes to be burned or 
who aids, counsels or procures the burning of a build­
ing, structure or personal property, whether h is 
property or the property of another, which at the 
time is insured against loss or damage by fire, is 
guilty of a felony, and upon conviction is punishable 
by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 
five years, or by a fine of not more than $3,000, or 
by both. 
Sec. 11.15. 340. NEGLIGENT USE OF COMBUSTIBLE 
MATERIALS. A person who negligently or recklessly 
causes a fire which results in physical harm to 
another person or in damage to the property of 
another is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon con­
viction is punishable by imprisonment for not more 
than one year, or by a fine of not more than $500, 
or by both. 
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ARTICLE 4. FORGERY AND RELATED OFFENSES 
Sec. 11. 20.180. MAKING, ALTERING OR DEFACING MARKS 
OR BRANDS. A person who wilfully and knowingly makes, 
alters, or defaces an artificial earmark, button or 
brand upon a horse, mare, gelding, foal, mule, ass, 
jenny, bull, cow, steer, calf, sheep, swine, goat, 
reindeer or fox, which is the property of another, with 
intent to convert it to his own use, is guilty of 
larceny, and upon conviction is punishable by imprison­
ment in the penitentiary for not less than one nor 
more than five years. 
Sec. 11.20.380. FALSE INVOICE TO DEFRAUD INSURER. 
The owner of a ship, steamboat, or other vessel, or 
the owner of property loaded or pretended to be loaded 
on board a ship, steamboat or other vessel, or a person 
concerned or assisting in the fitting out or loading 
of a ship, steamboat, or other vessel, who makes out 
or exhibits or causes to be made out or exhibited a 
false or fraudulent invoice, bill of lading, bill of 
parcels, or other false estimate.of property loaded or 
pretended to be loaded on board, with intent to injure 
or defraud an insurer of the ship, steamboat, or other 
vessel or property, or any part of it, upon conviction, 
is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for 
not less than six months nor more than three years. 
Sec. 11.20.430. FALSIFYING OR DESTROYING CORPORATE 
OR COMPANY RECORDS. A person, being or assuming to be 
an officer, agent, or member of a private corporation 
or company who, with intent to defraud or deceive, wil­
fully and knowingly destroys, alters, mutilates, or in, 
any manner falsifies, or concurs in the destruction, 
alteration, mutilation, or falsification of any books, 
papers, writings, or securities belonging to or in 
the possession of the corporation or company, upon 
conviction, is punishable, by imprisonment in a jail 
for not less than three months nor more than one year, 
or by a fine of not less than $50 nor more than $1, 000. 
Sec. 11.20.440. FALSE REPORTS AS TO CORPORATIONS 
OR COMPANIES. A person, being or assuming to be an 
officer, agent, or member of a private corporation or 
company who, with intent to defraud or deceive, wilfully 
and knowingly makes, circulates, publishes, or concurs 
in the making, circulating, or publishing of a written 
or printed statement or account relating to the liabilities, 
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assets, or property of the corporation or company, 
which is false in any material particular, upon 
conviction, is punishable as provided in§ 430 of 
this chapter. 
Sec. 11. 25 . 010. FORGERY OF RECORD OR CERTIFICATE 
AND UTTERING FORGED INSTRUMENT. A person who, with 
intent to injure or defraud, (1) falsely makes, alters, 
forges, counterfeits, prints, or photographs a public 
record, certificate, return, or attestation of a clerk, 
notary public, or other public officer in relation 
to a matter in which the certificate, return or at­
testation may be received as legal evidence, or a 
note, certificate, or other evidence of debt issued 
by an officer of the state, or borough, town, or other 
municipal or public corporation, authorized to issue 
it, or a contract, charter, letters, patent, deed, 
lease, bill of sale, will, testament, bond, writing 
obligatory, undertaking, letter of attorney, policy 
of insurance, bill of lading, bill of exchange, promis­
sory note, evidence of debt, or any acceptance of a 
bill of exchange, endorsement or assignment of a pro­
missory note, or a warrant, order, check, money, other 
property, a receipt for money or other property, an 
acquittance or discharge for money or other property, 
or a plat, draft, or survey of land; or (2) intentionally 
utters or publishes as true and genuine a false, altered, 
forged, counterfeited, falsely printed, or photographed 
record, writing, instrument, or other matter, upon 
conviction, is punishable by imprisonment in the 
penitentiary for not less than two years nor more than 
20 years. 
Sec. 11 . 25. 020. FORGERY OF EVIDENCES OF DEBT 
OR UTTERING FORGED EVIDENCE OF DEBT. A person who, 
with intent to injure or defraud another (1) makes, 
alters, forges, or counterfeits a bank bill, promis­
sory note, draft, check, or other evidence of debt 
issued by a person or by the federal government, the 
state, a state or territory of the United States, or 
another state, government, or country, or by a corpora­
tion, company, or person authorized by law to issue 
evidence of debt ; or (2) knowingly utters, publishes, 
passes, or tenders in payment as true and genuine, 
a false, altered, forged, or counterfeited bill, note, 
draft, check, or other evidence of debt, or has in 
his possession that evidence of debt, with intent 
to utter or pass it as true and genuine, knowing it 
to be false, altered, forged, or counterfeited is 
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for 
not less than one year nor more than 20 years. 
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Sec. 11.25.030. MAKING OR POSSESSING TOOL OR 
MATERIAL DESIGNED FOR COUNTERFEITING. A person who 
(1) engraves, makes, or begins to engrave, make, or 
mend a plate, block , press, or other tool, instrument, 
or implement; or (2) makes, prepares , or provides 
paper or other material adapted and designed for 
forging or making a false or counterfeit evidence of 
debt, as specified in§ 20 of this chapter; or (3) 
has in his possession or control a plate, block, press 
or other tool, instrument, or implement, or paper or 
other material adapted and designed for forging or 
making a false or counterfeit evidence of debt with 
intent to use it, or to cause or permit it to be 
used, in forging or making that false or counterfeit 
evidence of debt, upon conviction, is  punishable by 
imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than 
one year nor more than five years. 
Sec. 11.25.040. COUNTERFEIT COINS. A person 
who (1) counterfeits a gold, silver, or other coin 
which is current by law or usage in the state, or 
has in his possession or control a false coin counter­
feited in the similitude of a gold, silver, or other 
coin current by law or usage, knowing it is false and 
counterfeit, and with intent to utter and pass it as 
true and genuine; or (2) with intent to injure or 
defraud another, knowingly utters, passes, or tenders 
in payment as true and genuine a false and counterfeit 
coin, is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary 
for not less than one year nor more than 10 years. 
Sec. 11.25.050. MAKING OR POSSESSING COUNTER­
FEITING TOOL. A person who stamps, engraves, makes, 
or mends, or begins to stamp, engrave, make, or mend, 
or have in his possession or control, a mold, pattern, 
die, puncheon, engine, press, or other tool, implement, 
or instrument adapted and designed for coining or making 
a counterfeit coin in the similitude of a gold, silver, 
or other coin current by law or usage in the state, 
with intent to use it or cause or permit it to be 
used in coining or making a false and counterfeit 
coin, upon conviction, is punishable in the manner 
provided in§ 40 of this chapter. 
Sec. 11.25.060. JOINING PARTS OF GENUINE INSTRUMENTS. 
A person who connects together different parts of several 
bank notes or other genuine instruments to produce an 
additional or different note or instrument, with intent 
to utter or pass all of them as true and genuine, 
commits a forgery in the same manner and with the 
same effect as if each of them had been falsely made 
or forged, and is punishable by imprisonment in the 
penitentiary for not less than two years or more than 
20 years. 
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Sec. 11.25. 070. MAKING FALSE OR ALTERING RECEIPTS 
OF GOODS IN WAREHOUSE. A person who wilfully or know­
ingly makes or alters a receipt or other written evidence 
of the delivery into a warehouse, commission house, 
forwarding house, mill, store, or other building occupied 
by him or his employer, of any grain, flour, pork, 
beef, wool, or other goods, wares, or merchandise 
which have not been received or delivered previous 
to the making and uttering of the receipt or other 
written evidence of delivery, upon conviction, is 
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for 
not less than one year nor more than five years, or 
by imprisonment in a jail for not less than three 
months nor more than one year. 
Sec. 11.25 . 080. COUNTERFEITING OR IMITATING 
BRANDS. A person who wilfully and knowingly uses or 
has used the private brand, label, stamp , or trade­
mark of another , either by counterfeiting it or using 
an impression or copy of it made or prepared by the 
proprietor of it; or wilfully and knowingly uses or has 
used a colorable imitation of the private brand, label, 
stamp, or trademark of another, with intent to deceive, 
upon conviction, is punishable by imprisonment in a 
jail for not less than one month nor more than six 
months, or by a fine of not less than $20 nor more 
than $300. 
Sec. 11.25.090. AFFIXING FICTITIOUS SIGNATURE. 
Affixing a fictitious or pretended signature purporting 
to be the signature of an officer or agent of a public 
or private corporation to an instrument or writing 
purporting to be a note, draft, or other evidence of 
debt issued by the corporation, with intent to utter 
or pass it as true and genuine� is a forgery, though 
the person whose signature is affixed may never have 
been an officer or agent of the corporation, or the 
corporation may never have existed. The person affixing 
the fictitious or pretended signature is punishable 
by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than 
two years or more than 20 years. 
Sec. 11.25.110. PUNISHMENT ON SUBSEQUENT CONVICTION. 
A person convicted of a crime defined in§§ 10-100 of 
this chapter who is afterwards convicted of the same 
or other crime defined in§§ 10-100 of this chapter, is 
punishable by imprisonment for not less than the 
longest term mentioned in the section under which he 
may be indicted and tried. 
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Sec. 11.25 . 120 . ADULTERATING GOLD DUST. A 
person who mixes or adulterates gold dust with a 
metal coin of less value than the gold dust, with 
intent to pass or sell or in any way dispose of the 
mixed or adulterated gold dust as genuine; or passes, 
sells or otherwise disposes of or causes to be sold, 
passed, or otherwise disposed of, or attempts to pass, 
sell, or dispose of, as genuine and pure, mixed or 
adulterated gold dust, knowing it to be so mixed or 
adulterated, is punishable by imprisonment in the 
penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than 
five years. 
Sec. 1 1.25.130. POSSESSION OF MIXED OR ADULTERATED 
GOLD DUST. A person who possesses mixed or adulterated 
gold dust as described in§ 120 of this chapter, 
knowing it to be mixed or adulterated, with intent to 
pass or sell or dispose of it as pure and genuine, or 
to have it sold, passed, or disposed of as pure and 
genuine gold dust, upon conviction, is punishable by 
imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than 
one year nor more than five years. 
Sec. 11.30.270. FILING, OR OFFERING FOR FILING, 
FALSE OR FORGED INSTRUMENTS. A person who knowingly 
procures or offers a false or forged instrument to 
be filed, registered, or recorded in a public office, 
which, if genuine, might be filed, registered, or 
recorded under a law of this state or the federal 
government, is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction 
is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for 
not less than one year nor more than two years, or 
by a fine of not more than $2, 000, or by both. 
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1 2 5 . 
INDEX TO COMMENTARY ON TENTATIVE DRAFT (Continued) Page 
1 1 . 4 6 . 4 9 0  
Forgery and Related Offenses 
1 1 .  4 6 .  5 0 0  
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1 1 .  4 6 .  5 4 0  
1 1 .  4 6 .  5 5 0  
1 1 . 4 6 . 5 7 0  
1 1 . 4 6 . 5 8 0  
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1 1 . 4 6 . 9 8 0  
.11 . 4 6 . 9 9 0 ( 1 )  
1 1 . 4 6 . 9 9 0 ( 2 )  
1 1 . 4 6 . 99 0 ( 3 )  
1 1 . 4 6 . 9 9 0 ( 4 )  
1 1 . 4 6 . 9 9 0 ( 5 )  
1 1 . 4 6 . 9 9 0 ( 6 )  
1 1 . 4 6 . 9 9 0 ( 7 )  
1 1 .  4 6 .  9 9 0  ( 8 )  
1 1 . 4 6 . 9 9 0 ( 9 )  
1 1 . 4 6 . 9 9 0 ( 1 0 )  
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8 2  
8 9  
9 0  
9 1  
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9 4  
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4 2  
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